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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis consists of three main chapters, which contribute to the literature on dynamic
contract theory and dynamic public finance. The chapters are self-contained and can be
read separately. A short summary of each chapter is provided below.
Repeated moral hazard with history-dependent preferences
Chapter 2 introduces history-dependent preferences into the repeated moral hazard
framework: the agent’s instantaneous consumption utility may depend on both present
and past levels of consumption. The paper shows in what sense the Inverse Euler equa-
tion generalizes to this environment and derives implications for the intertemporal wedge
between the principal’s rate of return to saving and the agent’s shadow rate of return.
While the intertemporal wedge is positive under mild assumptions for all two-period
models with history-dependence, the intertemporal wedge is generally indeterminate for
models with a longer time-horizon. Finally, the paper contrasts some specific functional
forms of history-dependence.
2 Introduction
The first-order approach to moral hazard problems with hidden
saving
Moral hazard models with hidden saving decisions are useful to study such diverse prob-
lems as unemployment insurance, income taxation, executive compensation, or human
capital policies. How can we solve such models? In general, this is very difficult. Under
the conditions derived in Chapter 3, however, we can replace the incentive constraint
with the associated first-order condition. This allows the application of simple La-
grangian methods and yields a precise characterization of optimal contracts. To obtain
tractable conditions for the validity of this approach, the paper draws on the concept
of log-convexity. Since log-convexity, unlike convexity, is preserved under multiplica-
tion, the paper is able to separate the assumptions on the output distribution from the
assumptions on the agent’s preferences in a specific sense, even though the interaction
between these two is important for the agent’s incentives.
The first-order approach is valid if the following conditions hold: a) the agent has nonin-
creasing absolute risk aversion (NIARA) utility, b) the output technology has monotone
likelihood ratios (MLR), and c) the distribution function of output is log-convex in effort
(LCDF). Finally, the paper shows how the curvature of optimal wage schemes can be
used to relax the above conditions.
Optimal income taxation with asset accumulation
Chapter 4 is joint work with A´rpa´d A´braha´m (European University Institute) and Nicola
Pavoni (University College London). This paper studies the effect of capital taxation on
the shape of labor income taxes. We consider a two-period model of social insurance. By
exerting effort, agents can influence their labor income realizations. Moreover, agents
can use a risk-free bond for intertemporal self-insurance. We show that the planner’s
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trade-offs in designing optimal effort incentives depend crucially on the tax rate on bond
returns. Through this channel, taxing the bond affects the structure of optimal labor
income taxes. Specifically, when agents have preferences with convex absolute risk-
aversion, we find that taxing the bond leads to more progressivity of optimal marginal
tax rates on labor income.
Chapter 2
Repeated moral hazard with
history-dependent preferences
2.1 Introduction
The Inverse Euler equation, initially discovered by Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) and
Rogerson (1985b), recently generalized by Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (2003),
is arguably one of the most important findings in the dynamic contracting literature. The
equation is based on the central observation that the agent’s utilities can be intertem-
porally adjusted without changing the incentives to exert effort. As a consequence,
the principal’s marginal costs of providing utility today must be equal to the expected
marginal costs of providing utility tomorrow. For history-independent (in other words,
time-separable) preferences, the marginal costs of providing utility are given by the
agent’s inverse marginal utility of consumption. The Inverse Euler equation is therefore
an immediate consequence of the previous observation.
However, the Inverse Euler equation requires a strong assumption regarding the agent’s
preferences as the above argument shows. The present paper introduces a more gen-
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eral preference class into the principal-agent framework. Following similar ideas in the
macroeconomic literature,1 the agent’s preferences are allowed to be history-dependent.
More precisely, the agent’s consumption utility may depend on both present and past
levels of consumption. In this setup, the simple link between the principal’s marginal
costs of providing utility and the agent’s inverse marginal utility of consumption breaks
down and thus the Inverse Euler equation does not longer apply. The goal of this paper
is to characterize optimal contracts in this environment and study the robustness of the
lessons drawn from the Inverse Euler equation. This task is important not only from
a theoretical point of view, but also from a more applied perspective, considering that
history-independent preferences might be too narrow to describe and predict economic
behavior (Helson 1964, Frederick and Loewenstein 1999).
In the first part of this paper, I study history-dependent preferences in a two-period
model (with a risk-averse agent and a risk-neutral principal) and identify two key prop-
erties of optimal contracts. First, I show that, conditional on present information, the
expectation of the agent’s marginal rate of intertemporal substitution is equal to the
principal’s rate of return to saving. Note that the rate of return to saving coincides with
the principal’s marginal rate of intertemporal substitution. Intuitively, if the expecta-
tions of the marginal rates of intertemporal substitution differ between the two parties,
then the principal can extract “gains from trade” by rebalancing the agent’s utility be-
tween the present and the future. If the principal perturbs the agent’s future utility in
a uniform way across states, then such intertemporal adjustments do not violate the in-
centive constraint. Therefore, a contract can only be optimal when intertemporal “gains
from trade” are impossible.
For history-independent preferences, the above insight is in fact equivalent to the Inverse
Euler equation. Hence, we learn in what sense the Inverse Euler equation generalizes to
1See Ryder and Heal (1973) for the pioneering contribution.
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preferences with history-dependence: The correct interpretation does not consider the
agent’s marginal utilities, but his marginal rate of intertemporal substitution.
In a second step, I explore how saving distorts the incentive problem. For models
with history-independent preferences, the Inverse Euler equation implies that opti-
mal contracts feature a positive intertemporal wedge: The principal’s rate of return
to saving exceeds the shadow rate of return associated with the agent’s consump-
tion scheme (Diamond and Mirrlees 1978, Rogerson 1985b, Golosov, Kocherlakota, and
Tsyvinski 2003). Therefore, the agent would choose to save if he had access to the same
savings technology as the principal. This insight has important consequences for the
decentralization of optimal allocations and means that the agent’s asset returns must be
corrected by a tax system (Kocherlakota 2005, Albanesi and Sleet 2006). In the present
setup, by contrast, the intertemporal wedge may be positive or negative. This implies
that the agent’s access to the savings technology must be distorted as well, but it is
possible that borrowing becomes the crucial problem.
However, negative intertemporal wedges are not generic (in the two-period setup). I
show that the intertemporal wedge is positive if the agent’s marginal rate of intertem-
poral substitution increases in future consumption. Put differently, this condition states
that the agent’s willingness to trade future for present consumption increases with the
level of future consumption. This condition is trivially satisfied for preferences that are
history-independent. Given its economic meaning, the condition seems also innocuous
for the class of history-dependent preferences. Hence, the result is surprisingly strong.
Even though history-dependence may change the agent’s savings policy quite drastically
compared to the standard model, the positivity of the intertemporal wedge is a very
robust insight. Moreover, I point out how this result relates to the impact of saving on
the effectiveness of the incentive scheme.
In the second part of this paper, I extend the time-horizon to more than two periods. It
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is straightforward that all results from the two-period model apply to the last two dates
of the multi-period model. In general, however, the structure of optimal allocations can
be different from the two-period setup. Specifically, I show that the expectation of the
agent’s marginal rate of intertemporal substitution is not equal to the principal’s rate of
return to saving in general. The intuition for this finding is closely linked to the above
discussion. For the multi-period model, it is not generally true that the principal can
realize “gains from trade” when the expected marginal rates of intertemporal substitu-
tion differ between the two parties. With history-dependent preferences, adjustments in
the timing of rewards for periods t and t + 1 will change the agent’s preferences, and
hence the incentives to exert effort, in periods t+ 2 and later. This effect may be more
important than equalizing the expected willingness to trade between periods t and t+1
across the two parties.
The previous finding has direct implications for the intertemporal wedge in the multi-
period model: There is no longer such a simple link between monotonicity of the marginal
rate of intertemporal substitution and the sign of the intertemporal wedge. More pre-
cisely, the intertemporal wedge between periods t and t+1 is now the sum of two terms.
The first term is well-known from the two-period model and, ceteris paribus, fosters a
positive intertemporal wedge when the agent’s willingness to trade period-(t + 1) for
period-t consumption increases in the level of period-(t + 1) consumption. From the
study of the two-period model, we can relate this term to the impact of saving on the
agent’s incentives to exert effort in period t + 1. The second term captures the differ-
ence between the principal’s rate of return to saving and the expectation of the agent’s
marginal rate of intertemporal substitution. Roughly speaking, this term reflects the
impact of saving on the incentives to exert effort in periods t + 2 and later. Using
two simple examples, I show that the sign and the size of this second term are highly
sensitive to the exact functional form of history-dependence. Therefore, the sign of the
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intertemporal wedge in the multi-period model is generally indeterminate.2
Overall, this paper bridges the gap between the literature on dynamic moral hazard
initiated by Rogerson (1985b) and the literature on history-dependent preferences (or
habit formation). In macroeconomic models, history-dependent preferences have been
studied by Ryder and Heal (1973), Abel (1990), Constantinides (1990), and Campbell
and Cochrane (1999), among others.3 Frederick and Loewenstein (1999) review the
substantial body of empirical research supporting this approach. For instance, workers’
self-reported well-being is often strongly related to recent changes in pay, but not so
much to absolute levels of pay (Clark 1999, Grund and Sliwka 2007). More generally, the
psychological literature documents that the repetition of any stimulus tends to reduce the
perception and response to it (Helson 1964). Interpreting consumption as a stimulus, this
suggests that, other things being equal, past consumption has an important (negative)
influence on current well-being.
So far, however, the impact of time-nonseparable preferences on incentive problems is
largely unexplored. The only exception is the work by Grochulski and Kocherlakota
(2010), who study a dynamic Mirrleesian taxation model. Their paper provides a first
example in which time-nonseparable preferences change the intertemporal wedge. More-
over, the paper finds that the standard way of decentralizing optimal allocations has an
important measurability problem when preferences are not time-separable. To remedy
this problem, the authors consider a ‘social security system’ that uses the retirement
date to implement the required taxes and transfers. The present paper is complemen-
tary to those findings. I focus on how the intertemporal structure of optimal allocations
depends on the time-separability of preferences and show under what conditions the
2Recall, however, that the intertemporal wedge between the last two periods is positive under mild
assumptions; see the discussion of the two-period model.
3In particular, models with history-dependent preferences have contributed to the solution of em-
pirical puzzles related to consumption behavior (excess sensitivity puzzle, excess smoothness puzzle),
asset pricing (equity premium puzzle) and the relationship between savings and growth; see Messinis
(1999) for a review.
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intertemporal wedge can be determined.4
On a related note, the present paper provides a new perspective on the seminal results
by Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) and Rogerson (1985b). By leaving the class of time-
separable preferences, the paper identifies the true driving forces for those results. In
particular, we see that the positive intertemporal wedge in those models is generated by
two factors: First of all, time-separable preferences entail that the agent’s willingness
to trade present consumption for next period’s consumption is increasing in the level
of next period’s consumption. This property implies that, at the optimal contract,
private saving reduces the power of next period’s incentives. Secondly, time-separable
preferences entail that perturbations of the consumption scheme between two subsequent
periods do not affect the agent’s preferences (and thus the effort incentives) for any other
periods.
In addition, the present paper can be seen as a complement to the literature on effort
persistence, which extends the Rogerson (1985b) model by allowing for a technology that
is not time-separable; see Mukoyama and Sahin (2005), Kwon (2006), Jarque (2010), and
Hopenhayn and Jarque (2010). In that setup, the Inverse Euler equation is not affected.
Hence, effort persistence and history-dependent preferences (“preference persistence”)
have fundamentally different effects on the shape of optimal contracts. The reason is that
effort persistence alters the information structure of the model, but leaves the preference
structure unchanged.
Finally, this paper is related to the discussion on functional forms of history-dependence;
compare Rozen (2010). A common approach is to define the agent’s utility function on a
weighted average of current consumption and current consumption minus the reference
level (e.g. Constantinides 1990). Another approach is to aggregate current consumption
4Notice that the sign of the intertemporal wedge is also crucial for the shape of the decentralization
mechanism. In particular, the ‘regressivity’ of wealth taxes a` la Kocherlakota (2005) is exactly due to
the positive sign of the wedge in the time-separable model.
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and the reference level in a Cobb-Douglas fashion (e.g. Abel 1990). I contrast these
two formulations and show that the latter can have counterintuitive implications for
the effect of saving on the agent’s incentives to exert effort. Therefore, the weighted
average formulation of history-dependence appears much more suitable in the present
framework.5
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 sets up the basic two-period model. Section
2.3 generalizes the Inverse Euler equation and characterizes the intertemporal wedge. In
Section 2.4, I discuss a few specific functional forms of history-dependence. Section 2.5
extends the model to a longer time-horizon and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Model
I study a two-period moral hazard problem in which the agent’s preferences are history-
dependent: Second-period consumption utility may depend on consumption in both pe-
riods. This setup generalizes the time-separable model introduced by Rogerson (1985b).
2.2.1 Preferences
The relationship between principal (P) and agent (A) lasts for two periods; see Section
2.5 for a longer time-horizon. P maximizes expected profits. She has access to a linear
savings technology at the rate R, thus her discount factor equals 1/R.
A has von-Neumann-Morgenstern preferences and maximizes the expected value of
u(c1)− v(e1) + β(u˜(c1, c2)− v(e2)),
5For the multi-period problem, an additional complication arises: one needs to specify a mapping
from the consumption history to the reference level. This question is beyond the scope of the present
paper, however.
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where ct denotes consumption, et represents effort, and β ∈ (0, 1] is the discount factor.
The functions u, u˜, v are twice continuously differentiable. The derivatives of u and v
are denoted u′ and v′, while the partial derivatives of u˜ are denoted u˜1, u˜2.
Effort disutility v(e) is strictly increasing and weakly convex in e. Lifetime consumption
utility is strictly increasing and strictly concave in c1 and c2:
∀c1, c2 : u
′(c1) + βu˜1(c1, c2) > 0, u
′′(c1) + βu˜11(c1, c2) < 0,
∀c1, c2 : u˜2(c1, c2) > 0, u˜22(c1, c2) < 0.
To rule out boundary solutions, I suppose
∀c2 > 0 : lim
c1→0
(u′(c1) + βu˜1(c1, c2)) =∞,
∀c1 > 0 : lim
c2→0
u˜2(c1, c2) =∞.
I call A’s preferences history-independent (or time-separable) if u˜(c1, c2) does not
depend on c1. Otherwise, I call A’s preferences history-dependent. In the latter case,
I will refer to c1 as A’s second-period reference level of consumption.
2.2.2 Technology
In each period, A exerts a hidden work effort and thereby generates a publicly observable
stochastic output. Output realizations for period 1 are denoted xi, i = 1, . . . , N , with
associated probabilities πi(e1) > 0. Second-period output realizations are denoted xj,
j = 1, . . . , N , with associated probabilities πj(e2) > 0.
A cannot save or borrow, hence his consumption equals his wage in each period.
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2.2.3 Contracts
A contract is a specification (c, e) of wages c = (ci, cij)i,j and effort levels e = (e0, ei)i.
Here, e0 is the recommended effort for period 1, ei the recommended effort for period 2
given that xi has realized in period 1. Similarly, ci is the wage paid in period 1, cij is
the wage paid in period 2, given that outputs (xi, xj) have realized.
P offers a contract at the beginning of period 1. She has to respect A’s participation
constraint ∑
i,j
πi(e0)πj(ei)
(
u(ci)− v(e0) + β [u˜(ci, cij)− v(ei)]
)
≥ U. (PC)
In addition, since effort is not observed by P, contracts must satisfy the incentive com-
patibility constraint
e ∈ argmax
(e′
0
,e′i)
∑
i,j
πi(e
′
0)πj(e
′
i)
(
u(ci)− v(e
′
0) + β [u˜(ci, cij)− v(e
′
i)]
)
. (IC)
2.2.4 Optimal contracts
Contract (c, e) is called optimal if it maximizes P’s expected profits
∑
i,j
πi(e0)πj(ei)
(
xi − ci +
1
R
[xj − cij]
)
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint (IC) and the participation constraint
(PC).
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2.3 Results on intertemporal optimality
To simplify notation, I denote expectations conditional on first-period information xi by
Ei[ · ] in this section. For example, I write
∑
j
πj(ei)
u˜2(ci, cij)
= Ei
[
1
u˜2(ci, cij)
]
,
and so on.
2.3.1 Modification of the Inverse Euler equation
P can divide wages over time in the following way: The total reward for good performance
in period 1 need not be given immediately, but may also be included in second-period
wages (which makes the second-period wages dependent on the first-period output). If
at least one of the parties is risk-averse, as in the model considered here, then it is clearly
beneficial to make use of this option.
This reasoning yields the following intertemporal condition.6
Proposition 2.1. Let (c, e) be an optimal contract. Then for all i = 1, . . . , N
1
βR
Ei
[
1
u˜2(ci, cij)
]
=
1
u′(ci)
(
1−
1
R
Ei
[
u˜1(ci, cij)
u˜2(ci, cij)
])
. (2.1)
Proposition 2.1 states that P’s marginal cost of increasing A’s utility conditional on
output xi is constant over time: The cost of increasing u˜ by ǫ/β is approximately equal
to
ǫ
βR
Ei
[ 1
u˜2(ci, cij)
]
.
6All proofs can be found in the appendix.
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The cost of increasing u by ǫ while keeping u˜ constant is approximately equal to
ǫ
u′(ci)
−
ǫ
Ru′(ci)
Ei
[ u˜1(ci, cij)
u˜2(ci, cij)
]
,
where the first term denotes the increase of period-1 consumption required to raise u by
ǫ, and the second term represents the increase of period-2 consumption needed to keep
u˜ at the former level. Equation (2.1) shows that at any optimal contract these two costs
are the same.
If preferences are history-independent, with u = u˜, then equation (2.1) collapses to
1
u′(ci)
=
1
βR
Ei
[
1
u′(cij)
]
. (2.2)
This well-known result from Rogerson (1985b) is often called the Inverse Euler equation.
The relation between inverse marginal utilities described in equation (2.1) is slightly
different, thus we cannot attach the same label here. Yet, equations (2.1) and (2.2)
have exactly the same interpretation: For any optimal contract, P’s marginal costs of
providing utility conditional on a given output in period 1 must be equal across periods.
Finally, notice that equation (2.1) can equivalently be written as
Ei
[
u′(ci) + βu˜1(ci, cij)
βu˜2(ci, cij)
]
= R, (2.3)
which means that A’s conditionally expected marginal rate of intertemporal substitution
is equal to P’s marginal rate of intertemporal substitution, R. The intuition for equation
(2.3) is closely linked to the above discussion: If the conditionally expected marginal
rates of intertemporal substitution differ between P and A, then P can realize gains from
readjusting the timing of rewards while maintaining incentive compatibility.
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2.3.2 The intertemporal wedge
In dynamic models with hidden effort decisions, there is an intertemporal distortion due
to the influence of savings on the incentive problem. The intertemporal distortion in
models with history-independent preferences is well understood. Diamond and Mirrlees
(1978), Rogerson (1985b) and, in a more general framework, Golosov, Kocherlakota,
and Tsyvinski (2003) show that there is a positive intertemporal wedge in such models:
At optimal contracts, P’s rate of return to saving exceeds the shadow rate of return
associated with A’s consumption scheme.7
This subsection characterizes the intertemporal wedge for preferences that are history-
dependent. Recall that Ei[ · ] denotes expectations conditional on first-period informa-
tion xi, i.e., with respect to probability weights πj(ei). Similarly, covi( · , · ) represents
covariances with respect to πj(ei).
Consider the difference between P’s rate of return to saving and A’s shadow rate of
return,
R−
u′(ci) + βEi [u˜1(ci, cij)]
βEi [u˜2(ci, cij)]
.
It is convenient to divide this difference by P’s rate of return, R, and define the in-
tertemporal wedge (given output xi) as
Wi := 1−
u′(ci) + βEi [u˜1(ci, cij)]
RβEi [u˜2(ci, cij)]
. (2.4)
The intertemporal wedge can be characterized as follows.
Proposition 2.2. Consider an optimal contract. Then, conditional on first-period out-
7The shadow rate of return is defined as the rate at which A does not wish to save or borrow.
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put xi, the intertemporal wedge equals
Wi = 1−
R− covi
(
u˜1(ci, cij),
1
u˜2(ci,cij)
)
R−R covi
(
u˜2(ci, cij),
1
u˜2(ci,cij)
) . (2.5)
Hence, the intertemporal wedge is positive if and only if
covi
(
Ru˜2(ci, cij)− u˜1(ci, cij),
1
u˜2(ci, cij)
)
< 0. (2.6)
Proposition 2.2 proves that the sign of the intertemporal wedge coincides with the sign
of the negated covariance
− covi
(
Ru˜2(ci, cij)− u˜1(ci, cij),
1
u˜2(ci, cij)
)
.
Intuitively, this expression captures the hypothetical impact of saving on incentives: The
first variable in the covariance, Ru˜2− u˜1, is A’s marginal benefit of saving. This benefit
consists of the marginal payoff of saving, Ru˜2, plus the marginal utility of reducing the
reference level, −u˜1.
8 The second variable, 1/u˜2, is monotonic in A’s second-period
wage. If these two variables covary negatively, then saving tends to increase A’s utility
in the states with low wages relative to the states with high wages. In other words,
saving “hedges” against incentives, or “tightens” the incentive compatibility constraint.
Simply put, Proposition 2.2 thus shows that the intertemporal wedge is positive if and
only if saving “hedges” against the incentive scheme. This insight extends the intuition
from Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (2003) to the case of history-dependent
preferences. The explanation for the emergence of a positive intertemporal wedge, given
history-independent preferences, is that saving has an adverse effect on incentives. For
this reason, the social cost of saving is higher than A’s individual cost. It is optimal to
8A’s marginal cost of saving, u′(ci), does not show up here, because it is independent of the realization
of second-period output.
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equate the social marginal cost and benefit of saving, but not A’s individual marginal
cost and benefit. Therefore, at optimal contracts, A’s individual marginal benefit of
saving exceeds A’s individual marginal cost.
For history-independent preferences, with u = u˜, the above finding takes a particularly
simple form and equation (2.5) collapses to
Wi = 1−
1
1− covi
(
u′(cij),
1
u′(cij)
) . (2.7)
Since the inverse function is strictly decreasing, the covariance term in (2.7) is nonposi-
tive. Hence, we see that the intertemporal wedge is nonnegative in this case. Moreover,
we note that the wedge is positive unless the second-period wage cij is independent of j.
The intertemporal wedge, as Proposition 2.2 points out, is driven by the impact of saving
on A’s incentives to exert effort. It is important to notice that this result still involves
endogenous variables, since the covariances in (2.5) depend on the contract (c, e). We
will see now, however, that the sign of the wedge can be linked to a very simple property
of A’s preferences.
To simplify notation, write A’s marginal rate of intertemporal substitution as
M(c1, c2) :=
u′(c1) + βu˜1(c1, c2)
βu˜2(c1, c2)
.
Proposition 2.3. Let (c, e) be an optimal contract. Let the first-period output be xi and
suppose cij 6= cij′ for some j, j
′.9 Then the intertemporal wedge is positive (negative) if
M(c1, c2) is increasing (decreasing) in c2.
Proposition 2.3 is a strong result. Assuming that A’s willingness to give up future
consumption increases in the level of future consumption, i.e., assuming thatM(c1, c2) is
9The case with cij = cij′ for all j, j
′ is not interesting. It corresponds to the implementation of
minimal effort.
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increasing in c2, we always obtain a positive intertemporal wedge in this model. So, even
though history-dependence may change A’s savings policy quite drastically compared to
the time-separable case, the positivity of the intertemporal wedge is a very robust insight
in the present setting. We have to be somewhat careful, however, when extending this
finding to models with more than two periods; see Section 2.5.
The next section studies two specific forms of history-dependent preferences. For the
weighted average formulation, the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution increases
in future consumption. For the Cobb-Douglas specification, the latter property does
not generally hold. As a consequence, the intertemporal wedge can be negative in that
setup.
2.4 Functional forms of history-dependence
In this section, I explore the two most common formulations of history-dependent prefer-
ences: weighted averages and Cobb-Douglas aggregation. Among many others, Constan-
tinides (1990), Lahiri and Puhakka (1998), and Campbell and Cochrane (1999) follow
the first approach. Prominent examples of the Cobb-Douglas approach are Abel (1990)
and Carroll, Overland, and Weil (1997, 2000).
Both formulations impose two additional restrictions on A’s preferences: Utility in the
second period is decreasing in first-period consumption. In other words, A forms con-
sumption habits. Secondly, the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution decreases
as habits become more important.10 Notice, however, that the results derived in the
previous section did not rely on any of these two properties.
10For the Cobb-Douglas model, there is a range of the consumption space in which this property is
violated (Wendner 2003). I will only consider cases where the contracts do not fall into this range.
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2.4.1 Weighted averages
Let u : R+ → R be twice continuously differentiable, with u
′ > 0, u′′ < 0, limc→0 u
′(c) =
∞. Define period-1 consumption utility as u(c1) and period-2 consumption utility as
u˜(c1, c2) := u(c˜2), c˜2 := c2 − γc1. (2.8)
Effective consumption in period 2 can be rewritten
c˜2 = (1− γ)c2 + γ(c2 − c1).
That is, effective consumption a weighted average of absolute consumption, c2, and
absolute consumption minus the reference level, c2 − c1. The parameter γ ∈ [0, 1]
controls the importance of habits: The higher the value of γ, the more A cares about
how period-2 consumption relates to period-1 consumption.
By applying Proposition 2.3, we find that the intertemporal wedge is positive in this
setup.
Corollary 2.1. Let A’s preferences be given by (2.8), let (c, e) be an optimal contract
and suppose that for each i there exist j, j′ such that cij 6= cij′. Then the intertemporal
wedge is positive.
The remainder of this subsection discusses the comparative statics of optimal wage
profiles in the habit parameter. For time-separable preferences, the intertemporal slope
of wages is determined by the curvature of A’s inverse marginal utility, as Rogerson
(1985b) has shown. If A’s inverse marginal utility is convex, then expected wages are
nonincreasing over time. This convexity requirement is satisfied in many generic cases,
for instance for CRRA utility with a coefficient of relative risk aversion larger than one.
If A forms habits, then the intertemporal slope of wages does not only depend on the
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curvature of inverse marginal utility, but also on the importance of habits. This tends
to shift wages to the end of the relationship as we will see now.
For logarithmic utility, the functional relation between the slope of wages and the habit
parameter γ is particularly simple.
Example 2.1. Let u(c) = log(c), βR = 1. Then equation (2.1), the condition for
intertemporal optimality of rewards, takes the form
Ei
[
1
u′(c˜ij)
]
=
1
u′(ci)
(1 + βγ),
which implies
Ei[cij]
ci
= 1 + (1 + β)γ.
Thus, expected wages are constant over time if A does not form habits (γ = 0). If he
does form habits (γ > 0), then expected wages are increasing over time. Moreover, the
ratio between expected wages paid in period 2 and period 1 is increasing in the habit
parameter γ.
In the above example, expected wages are increasing over time for any positive habit
parameter. More generally, no matter what utility function is chosen, expected wages
will increase over time if the habit parameter is sufficiently large, as the following remark
shows.
Remark. Let γ = 1. If (c, e) is an optimal contract, then cij > ci for all i, j.
11
The ratio between expected wages at date 2 and date 1 is a monotonic function of the
habit parameter γ in the log-utility example. This result can be generalized. How-
ever, for non-logarithmic utility, the intertemporal condition (2.1) cannot be solved for
wage levels. The shape of wages can only be studied if one includes the incentive and
11For γ = 1, second-period utility takes the form u˜(ci, cij) = u(cij−ci). Therefore, the remark follows
immediately from the assumption limc→0 u
′(c) =∞.
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participation constraint in the analysis. To keep things tractable, I study the simplest
possible case: two effort levels, {l, h}, and two outputs, {xL, xH}, xL < xH . Probability
distributions satisfy πH(l) < πH(h), and effort costs are v(l) = 0, v(h) = v > 0. To
simplify notation, set ν := v/(πH(h)− πH(l)).
Suppose P wants to implement effort h in both periods (i.e., xH−xL is sufficiently large).
Then optimal contracts are characterized as follows:
1 + γ
R
u′(cH)
− πH(h)
1
βRu′(cHH − γcH)
− (1− πH(h))
1
βRu′(cHL − γcH)
= 0 (2.9)
1 + γ
R
u′(cL)
− πH(h)
1
βRu′(cLH − γcL)
− (1− πH(h))
1
βRu′(cLL − γcL)
= 0 (2.10)
u(cHH − γcH)− u(cHL − γcH)− ν = 0 (2.11)
u(cLH − γcL)− u(cLL − γcL)− ν = 0 (2.12)
u(cH) + u(cHL − γcH) + (1 + β)νπH(l)− ν − U = 0 (2.13)
u(cL) + u(cLL − γcL) + (1 + β)νπH(l)− U = 0. (2.14)
Here, (2.9),(2.10) are the intertemporal optimality conditions, (2.11),(2.12) ensure in-
centive compatibility of second-period effort, (2.13),(2.14) ensure incentive compatibility
of first-period effort, and together with (2.11),(2.12) also imply that the participation
constraint is satisfied.
This system of six equations can be separated into two subsystems with three equations
each—one system determining cH , cHL, cHH , and one determining cL, cLL, cLH . The com-
parative statics in the habit parameter γ are as follows.
Proposition 2.4. Let (c, e) be the optimal contract in the two-effort two-output model
described above. Then for each i, j, the ratio cij/ci is increasing in γ.
The intuition underlying Proposition 2.4 is straightforward. If the habit parameter γ
increases, A demands a higher compensation for the “comparison effects” generated by
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date-1 wages. This makes wages paid at date 1 more costly relative to wages paid at
date 2, hence P substitutes.
2.4.2 Cobb-Douglas aggregation
Let u : R+ → R be twice continuously differentiable, with u
′ > 0, u′′ < 0, limc→0 u
′(c) =
∞. Let γ ∈ [0, 1], ǫ > 0. Define period-1 consumption utility as u(c1) and period-2
consumption utility as
u˜(c1, c2) := u(c˜2), c˜2 :=
c2
(c1 + ǫ)γ
. (2.15)
Effective consumption in period 2 can be rewritten
c˜2 = c
1−γ
2
(
c2
c1 + ǫ
)γ
.
That is, effective consumption is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of absolute consumption, c2,
and absolute consumption relative to the reference level, c2/(c1 + ǫ).
12 The parameter
γ is the weight attached to the latter term. For an agent with a higher value of γ,
the comparison between date-2 consumption and date-1 consumption thus gets more
important in this sense.
The next proposition is the main result of this subsection. It shows that the present setup
changes the key insight of Rogerson’s (1985b) time-separable model: The intertemporal
12The introduction of ǫ > 0 in the reference level is a technical necessity for this specification. Note
that for ǫ = 0 one obtains
u′(c1) + βu˜1(c1, c2) = u
′(c1)− βγc
−γ−1
1 c2u
′(c˜2). (2.16)
Hence, in this case, the assumption u′(0) =∞ is no longer sufficient for the condition
∀c2 > 0 : lim
c1→0
(u′(c1) + βu˜1(c1, c2)) =∞, (2.17)
which is needed to make sure that solutions are interior. For ǫ > 0, this problem does not arise.
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wedge is not generally positive.
Proposition 2.5. Let A’s preferences be given by (2.15), let (c, e) be an optimal con-
tract and suppose that for each i there exist j, j′ such that cij 6= cij′. Then we have the
following.
(i) The intertemporal wedge is not positive in general.
(ii) The intertemporal wedge is positive if A’s coefficient of relative risk-aversion, −c˜2
u′′(c˜2)
u′(c˜2)
,
is bounded below by 1.
The reason why the intertemporal wedge is not generally positive has already been
pointed out in Section 2.3.2: While the hypothetical “hedging value” of saving is positive
in the time-separable model, this is not in general true for preferences with history-
dependence. Notice that A’s marginal benefit of saving, Ru˜2− u˜1, consists of two parts.
The marginal payoff of saving, Ru˜2, obviously covaries negatively with A’s second-period
wage. This captures a standard wealth effect of saving. In addition, there is a habit effect
of saving, since saving reduces A’s reference level. For the Cobb-Douglas formulation
of history-dependence, the marginal utility of reducing the reference level, −u˜1, covaries
positively with the second-period wage when the coefficient of relative risk-aversion is
smaller than one. In this situation, if the habit effect is sufficiently large, then A’s total
marginal benefit of saving covaries positively with the second-period wage, hence the
“hedging value” of saving is negative.
To provide a simple example where the intertemporal wedge is negative, I explore the
following environment.
Example 2.2. Consider the two-effort two-output problem described in the previous
subsection. The optimal contract is characterized by a system of equations analogous to
the system (2.9)–(2.14) from the weighted average formulation of history-dependence.
Assume R = β = 1, u(c) = 1
1−ρ
c1−ρ, ρ = 0.4, ǫ = 0.3, v = 0.1, πH(l) = 0.25, πH(h) = 0.5,
U = 2.
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Table 2.1 depicts optimal wages for different values of the habit parameter γ. Figures
2.1 and 2.2 display wages graphically. We see that first-period wages ci decrease in the
habit parameter γ, whereas second-period effective wages c˜ij increase in γ.
Figure 2.3 shows the intertemporal wedge for each output realization of period 1, xi ∈
{xL, xH}. For γ = 0, preferences are history-independent and thus the intertemporal
wedge is positive, of course. The wedge declines in γ, and eventually becomes negative.
Hence, there is a cutoff value of γ, below of which the intertemporal wedge is positive
for both first-period output realizations, and above of which the intertemporal wedge is
negative for at least one output realization. Define γ∗ as this cutoff value. In summary,
we have the following.
Observation 2.1. The intertemporal wedge decreases in γ and can become negative
(Figure 2.3).
The intuition is as follows. Since ρ < 1, the marginal habit effect of saving, −u˜1 =
γ(c1 + ǫ)
γ(ρ−1)−1c1−ρ2 , is increasing in second-period consumption c2. If γ is sufficiently
large, this will outweigh the negative relation between the marginal payoff of saving,
Ru˜2 = (c1 + ǫ)
γ(ρ−1)c−ρ2 , and second-period consumption. In that case, A’s marginal
benefit of saving, Ru˜2 − u˜1, will covary positively with second-period wages, hence the
hypothetical “hedging value” of saving will be negative.
The size of the covariance between the marginal payoff of saving and second-period wages
depends crucially on A’s risk aversion. The above discussion points out that the habit
effect of saving will dominate the wealth effect if the coefficient ρ of relative risk aversion
is small. This suggests that for small values of ρ, a relatively small habit parameter γ
will suffice to make the intertemporal wedge negative. Figure 2.4 shows the cutoff value
γ∗, above of which the intertemporal wedge is negative for at least one realization of
first-period output, for varying coefficients ρ of relative risk aversion. Indeed we see the
following.
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γ cH c˜HH c˜HL cL c˜LH c˜LL
0 0.57615 0.75031 0.42881 0.42444 0.58109 0.29632
0.1 0.50713 0.83061 0.49353 0.36826 0.63594 0.34152
0.2 0.40427 0.96563 0.60437 0.29368 0.72352 0.41315
0.3 0.24524 1.22542 0.82304 0.19830 0.87988 0.53872
0.4 0.10551 1.54966 1.10302 0.10978 1.09680 0.71313
0.5 0.05256 1.72965 1.26090 0.06041 1.24748 0.83940
0.6 0.03091 1.82740 1.34723 0.03648 1.33626 0.91567
0.7 0.02001 1.88827 1.40119 0.02380 1.39268 0.96471
0.8 0.01377 1.92978 1.43806 0.01638 1.43138 0.99855
0.9 0.00988 1.95983 1.46479 0.01171 1.45945 1.02320
1 0.00730 1.98254 1.48501 0.00861 1.48068 1.04189
Table 2.1: Optimal (effective) wages for different values of the habit parameter γ
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Figure 2.1: (Effective) wages, given high output in period 1
2.4 Functional forms of history-dependence 27
 0
 0.5
 1
 1.5
 2
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
habit parameter γ
(e
ff
ec
ti
v
e)
w
ag
e
cL
c˜LH
c˜LL
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Figure 2.3: Intertemporal wedge for high and low output in period 1. The wedges are negative
if the habit parameter is sufficiently large.
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Figure 2.4: Maximum value of the habit parameter for which both intertemporal wedges are
positive. This value is increasing in the coefficient of relative risk aversion, ρ.
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Figure 2.5: Maximum value of the habit parameter for which both intertemporal wedges are
positive. This value is increasing in the intercept of the reference level, ǫ.
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Observation 2.2. The cutoff value γ∗ decreases as ρ gets smaller. Moreover, γ∗ ap-
proaches zero as ρ goes to zero. (Figure 2.4)
In other words, Figure 2.4 shows that the intertemporal wedge is negative if the habit
parameter γ is sufficiently large compared to the coefficient ρ of relative risk aversion.
Finally, we note the following.
Observation 2.3. There exist coefficients ρ < 1 with γ∗ = 1 (Figure 2.4).
Hence, the highest possible habit parameter (γ = 1) does not for all risk aversion co-
efficients ρ < 1 lead to negative intertemporal wedges. As Figure 2.5 shows, the set of
parameters with negative intertemporal wedges can be increased by decreasing the size
of the constant ǫ. This seems due to the fact that ǫ has a dampening effect on changes
in the reference level: The larger the size of ǫ, the smaller is the relative change of the
reference level c1 + ǫ given a reduction of consumption c1 by one unit.
2.5 Extension to multi-period models
Now I extend the setup introduced in Section 2.2 to 3 periods. It is straightforward to
show the respective insights also for models with T periods, with T > 3. The choice of
T = 3, however, allows to maintain much of the previous notation.
2.5.1 Notation
In this section, the relationship between P and A lasts for 3 periods. P maximizes
expected profits. A has von-Neumann-Morgenstern preferences and maximizes the ex-
pected value of
u(c1)− v(e1) + β(u˜(c1, c2)− v(e2)) + β
2(uˆ(c1, c2, c3)− v(e3)),
30 Repeated moral hazard with history-dependent preferences
where ct denotes consumption, et represents effort, and β ∈ (0, 1] is A’s discount factor.
To simplify notation, set
U(c1, c2, c3) := u(c1) + βu˜(c1, c2) + β
2uˆ(c1, c2, c3),
V (e1, e2, e3) := v(e1) + βv(e2) + β
2v(e3).
Effort disutility and consumption utility satisfy the usual assumptions: v(e) is strictly
increasing and weakly convex in e; consumption utility is strictly increasing and strictly
concave in c1, c2 and c3:
∀c1, c2, c3 : Ut(c1, c2, c3) > 0, Utt(c1, c2, c3) < 0, t = 1, 2, 3,
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. Moreover, to rule out boundary solutions, I
assume
∀c2, c3 > 0 : lim
c1→0
U1(c1, c2, c3) =∞,
∀c1, c3 > 0 : lim
c2→0
U2(c1, c2, c3) =∞,
∀c1, c2 > 0 : lim
c3→0
U3(c1, c2, c3) =∞.
Denote A’s marginal rate of intertemporal substitution between periods t and s
by
Mt,s(c1, c2, c3) :=
Ut(c1, c2, c3)
Us(c1, c2, c3)
.
In this section, a contract (c, e) specifies wages c = (ci, cij, cijk)i,j,k and effort levels
e = (e0, ei, eij)i,j. Here, eij is the recommended effort in period 3 for output history
(xi, xj), and cijk is the wage paid in period 3 for output history (xi, xj, xk). The meaning
of e0, ei and ci, cij is as before.
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Contract (c, e) is called optimal if it maximizes P’s expected profits subject to the
incentive compatibility constraint (IC) and the participation constraint (PC), i.e., if it
solves
max
c,e
∑
i,j,k
πi(e0)πj(ei)πk(eij)
(
xi − ci +
1
R
[xj − cij] +
1
R2
[xk − cijk]
)
s.t.
e ∈ argmax
(e′
0
,e′i,e
′
ij)
∑
i,j,k
πi(e
′
0)πj(e
′
i)πk(e
′
ij)
(
U(ci, cij, cijk)− V (e
′
0, e
′
i, e
′
ij)
)
(IC)
∑
i,j,k
πi(e0)πj(ei)πk(eij)
(
U(ci, cij, cijk)− V (e0, ei, eij)
)
≥ U. (PC)
2.5.2 Intertemporal optimality
As usual, Ei[ · ] and covi( · , · ) represent expectations and covariances conditional on
first-period information xi. Similarly, Eij[ · ] and covij( · , · ) denote expectations and
covariances conditional on second-period information (xi, xj).
Analogous to Section 2.3, define the intertemporal wedge between periods 1 and 2 as
Wi := 1−
Ei [U1(ci, cij, cijk)]
REi [U2(ci, cij, cijk)]
,
and define the intertemporal wedge between periods 2 and 3 as
Wij := 1−
Eij [U2(ci, cij, cijk)]
REij [U3(ci, cij, cijk)]
.
Recall that, in the two-period model, the sign of the intertemporal wedge was solely
determined by the monotonicity of A’s marginal rate of intertemporal substitution; see
Proposition 2.3. By following similar steps, we obtain the same result for the intertem-
poral wedge between periods 2 and 3 in the present model.
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Proposition 2.6. Let (c, e) be an optimal contract and let (xi, xj) be the output history in
period 2. Then Eij[M2,3(ci, cij, cijk)] = R. Moreover, supposing cijk 6= cijk′ for some k, k
′,
the intertemporal wedge between periods 2 and 3 is positive (negative) if M2,3(c1, c2, c3)
is increasing (decreasing) in c3.
Proposition 2.6 shows that the intertemporal wedge between periods 2 and 3 is positive
whenever A’s preferences satisfy the following regularity property: A’s willingness to give
up future consumption increases in the level of future consumption, i.e., M2,3 = U2/U3
is increasing in c3. Notice that, for history-independent preferences, U2 does not depend
on c3. Since U3 decreases in c3 due to concavity, the regularity property is thus satisfied
when preferences are history-independent. Given its sound economic interpretation, the
property seems also reasonable when considering history-dependent preferences. Hence,
the intertemporal wedge between periods 2 and 3 is positive under rather mild conditions.
The intertemporal wedge between periods 1 and 2 cannot be characterized in the same
way, however. First of all, we note the following.
Lemma 2.1. Let (c, e) be an optimal contract. Then we have Ei[M1,3(ci, cij, cijk)] = R
2
for all i.13
To gain some intuition, notice that R2 is P’s marginal rate of intertemporal substitution
between periods 1 and 3. Intuitively, if the conditionally expected marginal rates of
intertemporal substitution differ between P and A, then P can realize gains from read-
justing the timing of rewards while maintaining incentive compatibility. Suppose, for
instance, that the conditional expectation of A’s marginal rate of intertemporal substi-
tution between periods 1 and 3 is higher than R2. In this case, A’s willingness to trade
period-3 consumption for period-1 consumption exceeds P’s willingness to do so. By
13An earlier proof of an analogous result for dynamic Mirrleesian taxation models is provided by
Grochulski and Kocherlakota (2010). Instead of the perturbation technique employed in the present
paper, they use a Lagrangian approach.
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perturbing A’s wage scheme as in the above proof (with ǫ > 0), P can extract “gains
from trade” without affecting incentive compatibility. At an optimal contract, such gains
are impossible. This delivers the result.
Notice, however, that Proposition 2.7 is not informative on A’s marginal rate of in-
tertemporal substitution between periods 1 and 2. Using the identity M1,2 = M1,3/M2,3,
we have
Ei[M1,2] = Ei
[
M1,3
M2,3
]
.
In general, this expression can be different from
Ei[M1,3]
Ei[M2,3]
=
Ei[M1,3]
Ei[Eij[M2,3]]
=
R2
R
= R,
which suggests that Ei[M1,2] may not be equal to R in general.
As we will see now, Ei[M1,2] can in fact be smaller or larger than R. Moreover, as a
direct consequence, the previous link between the monotonicity of the marginal rate of
intertemporal substitution and the sign of the intertemporal wedge breaks down.
Proposition 2.7. Let (c, e) be an optimal contract and let xi be the output in period 1.
Then we have the following.
(i) Ei[M1,2(ci, cij, cijk)] is different from R in general (and can be smaller or larger than
R).
(ii) Supposing cij 6= cij′ for some j, j
′, the intertemporal wedge between periods 1 and 2
is not positive (negative) in general if M1,2(c1, c2, c3) is increasing (decreasing) in c2.
The intuition for the first part of Proposition 2.7 is closely related to the above discussion.
For periods 1 and 2, it is not necessarily true that P can extract “gains from trade” when
the conditionally expected marginal rates of intertemporal substitution differ between
P and A. Note that any perturbation of period-1 and period-2 wages will affect A’s
incentives in the third period if preferences are history-dependent. This effect may offset
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the efficiency gains from equalizing A’s and P’s willingness to trade between periods 1
and 2. Hence, a wage scheme may be optimal even when the conditional expectations
of A’s and P’s marginal rates of substitution between periods 1 and 2 do not coincide.
To understand the second part of Proposition 2.7, it is helpful to look into the proof
more closely. We find that the intertemporal wedge is positive if and only if
covi (−U2, M1,2) + Ei [U2]Ei [R−M1,2] > 0. (2.18)
Suppose for a moment that we have Ei [M1,2] = R, so that the second summand van-
ishes.14 In this case, the sign of the intertemporal wedge is fully determined by the sign
of the covariance covi (−U2, M1,2), which is in turn closely related to the monotonicity
of M1,2 in c2. For the two-period model, this shows that the intertemporal wedge is
positive whenever M1,2 is increasing in c2. Clearly, this insight extends to the last two
periods of any multi-period model.
However, as the first part of the proposition points out, Ei [M1,2] can be different from
R in general. Hence, the intertemporal wedge is not solely determined by the afore-
mentioned covariance term. If Ei [M1,2] is larger than R, then the second summand in
(2.18) is negative, hence a positive covariance term does not necessarily imply a positive
intertemporal wedge.
It seems rather difficult to conjecture whether, given a specification of A’s preferences,
Ei [M1,2] will be larger or smaller than R. The following examples provide concrete
setups for each case. Unfortunately, in light of the above discussion, this means that
it is generally very difficult to determine the sign of the intertemporal wedge for multi-
period models with history-dependent preferences (except for the last two periods).
Example 2.3. (i) In order to study the optimal contract analytically (rather than
14Notice that Ei [M1,2] = R holds true for the two-period model; see Proposition 2.1.
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numerically), I suppose there is no incentive problem in the first two periods, i.e., outputs
xi and xj are non-stochastic. In this case, wages ci, cij, cijk are obviously independent of
i, j. Moreover, the conditional expectations Ei[ · ] and Eij[ · ] coincide.
Let A’s consumption preferences be defined as follows:
U(c1, c2, c3) := u(c1) + u(c2) + u(c3 − γc1),
where u is a strictly increasing, strictly concave function and γ > 0.
By Proposition 2.6, the optimal contract satisfies R = Eij
[
U2
U3
]
. Since U2 is constant and
the conditional expectations Ei[ · ] and Eij[ · ] coincide, the previous result is equivalent
to 1
U2
= 1
R
Ei
[
1
U3
]
, which implies
Ei
[
U1
U2
]
=
1
U2
Ei [U1] =
1
R
Ei
[
1
U3
]
Ei [U1] .
Rewriting the right-hand side, we see
Ei
[
U1
U2
]
=
1
R
Ei
[
U1
U3
]
−
1
R
covi
(
U1,
1
U3
)
.
Recall that Lemma 2.1 implies Ei
[
U1
U3
]
= R2. Hence, the first summand on the right-
hand side equals R. The second summand is negative, since covi
(
U1,
1
U3
)
is positive as
one easily verifies. Summing up, we have
Ei
[
U1
U2
]
< R. (2.19)
Moreover, we can easily see that Wi, the intertemporal wedge between periods 1 and 2,
is positive in this example. Notice that Wi is positive if and only if Ei[U1] < REi[U2].
Since U2 is constant, this condition is in fact equivalent to (2.19).
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(ii) In the above environment, change A’s preferences to
U(c1, c2, c3) := u(c1) + u(c2) + u(c3 − γc2).
Using similar arguments as above, it is not difficult to find15
Ei
[
U1
U2
]
> R. (2.20)
On a related note, one can see that the intertemporal wedge between periods 1 and 2 is
negative in this setup (cp. Grochulski and Kocherlakota 2010, Section 3.2).
2.6 Concluding remarks
This paper introduces history-dependent preferences into the principal-agent framework.
The paper shows how to modify the Inverse Euler equation to account for effects of cur-
rent consumption on future preferences. Moreover, the paper characterizes the intertem-
poral wedge. While the results are derived in a moral hazard framework, they can be
15We first apply Jensen’s inequality and obtain
Ei
[
U1
U2
]
>
1
Ei
[
U2
U1
] .
Using Lemma 2.1, the fact that U1 is constant, and the observation that Ei[ · ] and Eij [ · ] coincide, this
is equivalent to
Ei
[
U1
U2
]
>
R2
Ei
[
1
U3
]
Ei [U2]
.
Rewriting the right-hand side, we have
Ei
[
U1
U2
]
>
R2
Ei
[
U2
U3
]
− covi
(
U2,
1
U3
) .
By Proposition 2.6, the optimal contract satisfies Ei
[
U2
U3
]
= R. Now the result follows from the
observation that covi
(
U2,
1
U3
)
is positive.
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easily extended to contracting problems with adverse selection. In fact, the driving force
for all results is the principal’s ability to adjust the timing of rewards. The question
whether the incentive problem stems from hidden actions or hidden information is thus
secondary.
The results in this paper characterize the efficient way of implementing a given effort
profile. For this question, the functional form of the agent’s effort preferences is obviously
irrelevant. Hence, all results go through if we allow effort costs to depend on past levels
of effort. A complementary and also very interesting question is what effort profile the
principal wants to implement. In that context, history-dependence of effort costs would
make an important difference. However, the latter question cannot be addressed in the
general environment studied in this paper. First of all, one needs a better understanding
of how past effort choices may influence people’s current preferences to work hard. This
creates an interesting direction for future research.
2.A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.1. The proof extends the argument in Rogerson (1985b). Let
h( · ) be the inverse of u( · ) and h˜(c1, · ) be the inverse of u˜(c1, · ), c1 fixed. For ǫ ∈ R,
construct a wage scheme cǫ from c as follows. Fix an arbitrary first-period output xi.
For this output, increase date-1 utility by ǫ and reduce date-2 utility by ǫ/β. Formally,
set
cǫk :=


ck for k 6= i,
h(u(ci) + ǫ) for k = i,
cǫkj :=


ckj for k 6= i,
h˜(cǫi , u˜(ci, cij)−
ǫ
β
) for k = i.
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Notice that the incentive and participation constraints under cǫ and c coincide. Hence, a
necessary condition for optimality of (c, e) is that expected wage payments are minimal
at ǫ = 0. That is, ǫ = 0 must minimize
h(u(ci) + ǫ) +
1
R
Ei
[
h˜(cǫi , u˜(ci, cij)−
ǫ
β
)
]
,
which implies the first-order condition
0 =
1
u′(ci)
+
1
R
Ei
[
−
1
β u˜2(ci, cij)
−
u˜1(ci, cij)
u′(ci) u˜2(ci, cij)
]
.
Equivalently,
1
βR
Ei
[
1
u˜2(ci, cij)
]
=
1
u′(ci)
(
1−
1
R
Ei
[
u˜1(ci, cij)
u˜2(ci, cij)
])
.
Proof of Proposition 2.2. Solve the first-order condition (2.1) for u′(ci) to get
u′(ci) = β
R− Ei
[
u˜1(ci,cij)
u˜2(ci,cij)
]
Ei
[
1
u˜2(ci,cij)
] .
Using
Ei
[
u˜1(ci, cij)
u˜2(ci, cij)
]
= covi
(
u˜1(ci, cij),
1
u˜2(ci, cij)
)
+ Ei [u˜1(ci, cij)]Ei
[
1
u˜2(ci, cij)
]
,
we find
u′(ci) = β
R− covi
(
u˜1(ci, cij),
1
u˜2(ci,cij)
)
Ei
[
1
u˜2(ci,cij)
] − βEi[u˜1(ci, cij)].
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Substitute this into definition (2.4) to obtain
Wi = 1−
R− covi
(
u˜1(ci, cij),
1
u˜2(ci,cij)
)
REi [u˜2(ci, cij)]Ei
[
1
u˜2(ci,cij)
] .
Now the result follows from
Ei[u˜2(ci, cij)]Ei
[
1
u˜2(ci, cij)
]
= 1− covi
(
u˜2(ci, cij),
1
u˜2(ci, cij)
)
.
Proof of Proposition 2.3. Suppose M(c1, c2) is increasing in c2. By definition, the in-
tertemporal wedge is positive if and only if
RβEi [u˜2(ci, cij)]− (u
′(ci) + βEi [u˜1(ci, cij)]) > 0.
Dividing by β, this condition can be rewritten as
Ei [u˜2(ci, cij) (R−M(ci, cij))] > 0.
It is not difficult to see that Proposition 2.1 yields R − Ei[M(ci, cij)] = 0, compare
equation (2.3). Hence, the above inequality is equivalent to
covi (u˜2(ci, cij), R−M(ci, cij)) > 0.
Since R is a constant, this holds if and only if
covi (−u˜2(ci, cij), M(ci, cij)) > 0. (2.21)
Since u˜(ci, cij) is concave in cij, the partial derivative −u˜2(ci, cij) is increasing in cij.
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By assumption, M(ci, cij) is also increasing in cij. Notice that the covariance of two
increasing functions of a random variable is positive. Hence, condition (2.21) is satisfied.
Proof of Corollary 2.1. Note M(c1, c2) =
u′(c1)
βu′(c2−γc1)
− γ. This shows that M(c1, c2) is
increasing in c2. Hence, the intertemporal wedge is positive by Proposition 2.3.
Proof of Proposition 2.4. Let i = H. (The case i = L is exactly analogous.) Applying
the implicit function theorem to the system of equations (2.9),(2.11),(2.13) yields
∂cH
∂γ
= −
β2
D
u′(cH)u
′(c˜HL)
3u′(c˜HH)
3
∂cHH
∂γ
= cH +
β
D
u′(cH)u
′(c˜HL)
3u′(c˜HH)
2[u′(cH)− γβu
′(c˜HH)]
∂cHL
∂γ
= cH +
β
D
u′(cH)u
′(c˜HL)
2u′(c˜HH)
3[u′(cH)− γβu
′(c˜HL)],
where
D = −(1− pH(h))u
′(cH)
3u′(c˜HH)
3u′′(c˜HL)
− u′(c˜HL)
3[(R + γ)β2u′(c˜HH)
3u′′(cH) + pH(h)u
′(cH)
3u′′(c˜HH)]
> 0.
Hence, the expression ∂cHH
∂γ
cH − cHH
∂cH
∂γ
is equal to
c2H +
β
D
u′(cH)u
′(c˜HL)
3u′(c˜HH)
2 [cHu
′(cH) + βc˜HHu
′(c˜HH)] ,
which is positive. This shows that the ratio cHH/cH is increasing in γ. Monotonicity of
cHL/cH can be seen analogously.
Proof of Proposition 2.5. (i) See Example 2.2 on page 24.
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(ii) The assumption −c˜2
u′′(c˜2)
u′(c˜2)
≥ 1 is equivalent to
−u′(c2(c1 + ǫ)
−γ)− c2(c1 + ǫ)
−γu′′(c2(c1 + ǫ)
−γ) ≥ 0.
Multiplying this by γ(c1 + ǫ)
−1−γ, we have
−γ(c1 + ǫ)
−1−γu′(c2(c1 + ǫ)
−γ)− γc2(c1 + ǫ)
−1−2γu′′(c2(c1 + ǫ)
−γ) ≥ 0,
which is equivalent to u˜12 ≥ 0. Thus, u
′(c1) + βu˜1(c1, c2) is increasing in c2. Since
u˜2(c1, c2) is decreasing in c2, we conclude that M(c1, c2) is increasing in c2. Hence, the
intertemporal wedge is positive by Proposition 2.3.
Proof of Proposition 2.6. To verify the first statement, consider the wage scheme cǫ that
is constructed as follows. Leave period-1 wages unchanged: cǫi := ci. Define period-2
and period-3 wages by:
u˜(ci, c
ǫ
ij) := u˜(ci, cij) + ǫ,
uˆ(ci, c
ǫ
ij, c
ǫ
ijk) := uˆ(ci, cij, cijk)−
ǫ
β
.
Now Eij[M2,3(ci, cij, cijk)] = R follows from the same steps as the proof of Proposition
2.1. To prove the second statement, use Eij[M2,3(ci, cij, cijk)] = R and proceed as in the
proof of Proposition 2.3.
Proof of Lemma 2.1. Consider the wage scheme cǫ that is constructed as follows. Leave
period-2 wages unchanged: cǫij := cij. Define period-1 and period-3 wages by:
u(cǫi) := u(ci) + ǫ,
uˆ(cǫi , cij, c
ǫ
ijk) := uˆ(ci, cij, cijk)−
ǫ
β2
+
1
β
(u˜(ci, cij)− u˜(c
ǫ
i , cij)) .
42 Repeated moral hazard with history-dependent preferences
Now the result follows from the same steps as the proof of Proposition 2.1.
Proof of Proposition 2.7. To verify the first statement, see Example 2.3. For the second
statement, note that the intertemporal wedge is positive if and only if
Ei [RU2(ci, cij, cijk)− U1(ci, cij, cijk)] > 0,
which can be rewritten as
Ei [U2(ci, cij, cijk) (R−M1,2(ci, cij, cijk))] > 0.
Omitting the argument (ci, cij, cijk), this inequality holds if and only if
covi (U2, R−M1,2) + Ei [U2]Ei [R−M1,2] > 0.
Since R is a constant, the previous condition is equivalent to
covi (−U2, M1,2) + Ei [U2] (R− Ei [M1,2]) > 0. (2.22)
As the first part of the proposition shows, R − Ei [M1,2] can be positive or negative in
general. Consequently, it is not difficult to construct examples where the left-hand side
in (2.22) is negative (positive) even though covi (−U2, M1,2) is positive (negative); see
Example 2.3 (ii), for instance.
Chapter 3
The first-order approach to moral
hazard problems with hidden saving
3.1 Introduction
The study of moral hazard models is enormously simplified if one can use the first-
order approach (Mirrlees 1974, Holmstro¨m 1979). By replacing the incentive constraint
with the associated first-order condition, this approach allows the application of La-
grangian methods. The seminal works of Rogerson (1985a) and Jewitt (1988) validate
this procedure for the standard moral hazard problem. Very little is known, however,
for more general environments. In particular, the validity of the first-order approach
is not well understood for moral hazard problems in which the agent can secretly save
(and borrow). This class of problems is particularly important, since observability of
the agent’s consumption-saving decision appears unrealistic for many common dynamic
applications of the moral hazard framework (e.g., employment relationships, insurance
problems, income taxation, etc.).
With hidden saving, validating the first-order approach becomes significantly more com-
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plex. In addition to making sure that the agent’s utility is at a global maximum with
respect to the effort decision, one has to ensure the same for the saving decision, and
most importantly for joint deviations to different effort and saving levels. Typically,
the agent would combine a reduction of effort with an increased savings level to insure
against the worsened output distribution. Therefore, ruling out joint deviations is the
main difficulty in showing that first-order conditions imply incentive compatibility. The
assumptions made by Rogerson (1985a) and Jewitt (1988) are not sufficient for such
a result, since they apply to the effort dimension only. In fact, it is not difficult to
find examples where the first-order approach to the model with hidden saving fails even
though Rogerson’s or Jewitt’s conditions are satisfied (Kocherlakota 2004). Due to the
two-dimensional decision space and the complementarity between shirking and saving,
there is no obvious way of strengthening those conditions. Therefore, the validity of the
first-order approach for this setup has remained unclear.
The present paper validates the first-order approach for two-period moral hazard models
with hidden saving. I show that the first-order approach is valid if the agent has non-
increasing absolute risk aversion (NIARA) utility, the output technology has monotone
likelihood ratios (MLR), and the distribution function of output is log-convex in effort
(LCDF). Note that a function is called log-convex if the logarithm of that function is
convex. Any log-convex function is convex, but not vice versa. Hence, compared to
Rogerson’s (1985a) assumption that the distribution function is convex in effort, LCDF
is a stricter requirement. Under LCDF, the probability that output exceeds a given level
is strongly concave in the agent’s effort choice. Intuitively, this states that the marginal
returns to effort are strongly decreasing in a particular sense.
The link from these conditions to the second-order effects of joint deviations is subtle.
Note that by reducing his effort, the agent increases the probability of being punished
by a low wage. By increasing his saving at the same time, he alleviates the severity of
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the punishment, since the utility difference between high and low wages will be reduced.
Decreasing marginal returns to effort and a convex marginal utility of consumption limit
the gains of such a strategy to some extent. The former implies that the probability of
being punished increases more quickly than linearly as effort is reduced; the latter implies
that the reduction of the punishment diminishes more quickly than linearly as saving
is increased. Since the two effects are multiplicative, however, those properties are still
too weak to ensure that a joint deviation is not attractive. At this point, the concept of
log-convexity proves useful. In contrast to convexity, log-convexity is not only preserved
under summation, but also under multiplication. Therefore, log-convexity of the agent’s
marginal utility of consumption (which is equivalent to NIARA) in combination with log-
convexity of the distribution function (LCDF) implies that the ‘punishment’ described
above is jointly log-convex (and hence convex) in effort and saving. This makes the
agent’s optimization problem jointly concave in his decision variables. Thus, first-order
conditions yield incentive compatibility and the first-order approach is valid.
I also derive alternative sufficient conditions for the validity of the first-order approach.
An important insight of the previous argument is the trade-off between convexity as-
sumptions on the marginal utility of consumption on the one hand and convexity as-
sumptions on the distribution function on the other hand. If one of the two functions
is more convex than log-linear, then the assumption on the other function can be weak-
ened. For a large class of utility functions, including CRRA utility, for example, this
allows a relaxation of the LCDF condition. Finally, I show how to relax the LCDF con-
dition by exploiting the curvature of the wage scheme. This allows me to validate the
first-order approach for some interesting examples in which the LCDF property and even
Rogerson’s (1985a) CDF condition fail. From a more general point of view, however,
the curvature of the contract is not as helpful as in the standard moral hazard problem,
since wages tend to become less concave in output under hidden saving.
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The present paper is the first to identify the convexity properties of the distribution
function and the agent’s marginal utility of consumption as the key driving forces for the
validity of the first-order approach under hidden saving. Another important contribution
is the introduction of log-convexity techniques. This idea gives optimization problems
with multiplicatively separable objectives a tractable convex structure and seems to be
useful for a much more general class of economic models.1
To the best of my knowledge, the only other result on the validity of the first-order
approach under hidden saving is the work by Abraham and Pavoni (2009). Like the
present paper, they also study a two-period model. However, they impose the ‘spanning
condition with dominance’ from Grossman and Hart (1983), which is a severe restriction
to the output technology. In fact, the condition imposes so much structure that moral
hazard problems can be characterized quite well even without the first-order approach
(Grossman and Hart 1983). Hence, assuming the spanning condition, it appears more
natural to look for an extension of the method described in Grossman and Hart (1983),
rather than for the validity of the first-order approach. The present paper does not need
the spanning condition. The paper obtains the result by Abraham and Pavoni (2009)
as a restrictive special case and goes much further.2
Establishing the validity of the first-order approach under hidden saving is valuable for a
number of reasons. First, it yields a precise characterization of optimal contracts. Ques-
tions on the monotonicity of consumption or the value of information can be answered
immediately, and one finds many analogies to the model without hidden saving. One
also finds an important difference between the two models: Optimal wage schemes tend
to be more convex in output under hidden saving. For a detailed discussion of this result,
I refer the reader to Chapter 4 of this thesis. Secondly, the first-order approach under
1I am not aware of any other work that highlights this idea.
2Example 3.4 in Section 3.3 shows that the distribution function is log-convex in effort given the as-
sumptions made by Abraham and Pavoni (2009). Moreover, Section 3.4 contains important relaxations
of the log-convexity assumption.
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hidden saving is helpful for a large range of applied questions. For instance, Bertola
and Koeniger (2009) use this approach to develop a theoretical model on cross-country
differences between public and private insurance. Gottardi and Pavoni (2010) build on
the first-order approach to address optimal capital taxation. Chade (2009) uses the
first-order approach to study efficient compensation contracts. Finally, the first-order
approach is important because it gives multi-period moral hazard problems with hid-
den saving a tractable recursive form, as discussed by Werning (2001), Werning (2002),
Kocherlakota (2004), and others. Analytical results for the validity of the first-order
approach provide a theoretical foundation for this procedure. The present paper marks
an important first step towards this goal. However, the extension from the present
two-period results to the multi-period problem remains a task for future research.3
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 describes the setup of the model. Section
3.3 validates the first-order approach given NIARA, MLR and LCDF. Section 3.4 shows
how to relax the latter assumption. Section 3.5 concludes. All proofs are presented in
the appendix.
3.2 Model
I study a two-period principal-agent problem. In the first period, the agent makes a
hidden saving decision. In the second period, the agent exerts a hidden work effort. The
contract is signed at the beginning of the first period and there is no renegotiation.
3For the multi-period problem, it will be crucial to understand how the value function changes with
the agent’s savings level. A characterization of the value function is beyond the scope of the present
paper, however. Note that conventional macroeconomic techniques are of limited help here, because the
model involves a hidden state in combination with an endogenously determined probability distribution.
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3.2.1 Preferences
The Principal (P) maximizes expected profits. P’s discount factor is 1/R, with R > 0.
The Agent (A) has von-Neumann-Morgenstern preferences and maximizes the expected
value of
u(c1) + β (u(c2)− v(e)) ,
where ct denotes consumption and e represents effort. Consumption utility u is twice
continuously differentiable and satisfies u′ > 0, u′′ < 0. Effort disutility v is twice
continuously differentiable and satisfies v′ > 0, v′′ ≥ 0.
3.2.2 Technology
In the first period, A is endowed with w0 units of the consumption good and can save
at the rate R > 0. Negative saving, i.e., borrowing, is allowed. The set of feasible
saving choices s is the real interval J , which may be bounded or unbounded.4 A’s saving
decision is not observable.
In the second period, A exerts an unobservable work effort e ∈ I, where I is a real
interval. This generates a publicly observable stochastic output x ∈ [x, x]. (All results
go through for discrete output spaces as well.) The output is distributed according to
the probability density f(x, e), which is continuously differentiable and has full support
for all e ∈ I.
3.2.3 Contracts
At the beginning of the first period, P proposes a contract (w(·), e, s) consisting of an
output-contingent wage scheme w(·) and recommended choices (e, s). A’s utility from
4The interval J may be bounded below due to a borrowing constraint and bounded above due to a
nonnegativity constraint.
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rejecting the contract is U . The contract is called optimal if it maximizes expected
profits subject to the incentive compatibility constraint and the participation constraint,
i.e., if it solves the following problem:
max
w(·),e,s
1
R
∫ x
x
(x− w(x))f(x, e) dx (P1)
s.t.
(e, s) ∈ argmax
(e′,s′)∈I×J
u(w0 −
s′
R
) + β
∫ x
x
u(w(x) + s′)f(x, e′) dx− βv(e′) (IC)
u(w0 −
s
R
) + β
∫ x
x
u(w(x) + s)f(x, e) dx− βv(e) ≥ U (PC)
3.2.4 First-order approach
Problem (P1) is extremely intricate. The incentive constraint (IC) consists of a two-
dimensional continuum of inequalities. For all e′ ∈ I, s′ ∈ J , it requires
u(w0 −
s
R
) + β
∫ x
x
u(w(x) + s)f(x, e) dx− βv(e)
≥ u(w0 −
s′
R
) + β
∫ x
x
u(w(x) + s′)f(x, e′) dx− βv(e′).
(3.1)
To obtain a problem that can be solved by standard methods, one replaces the incentive
constraint by the agent’s first-order necessary conditions. This gives rise to the following
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problem:
max
w(·),e,s
1
R
∫ x
x
(x− w(x))f(x, e) dx (P2)
s.t.
β
∫ x
x
u(w(x) + s)fe(x, e) dx− βv
′(e) = 0 (FOCe)
1
R
u′(w0 −
s
R
)− β
∫ x
x
u′(w(x) + s)f(x, e) dx = 0 (FOCs)
u(w0 −
s
R
) + β
∫ x
x
u(w(x) + s)f(x, e) dx− βv(e) ≥ U (PC)
Solutions to (P2) are denoted by (w∗(·), e∗, s∗). The associated consumption levels are
denoted by c∗0 = w0 − s
∗/R and c∗(x) = w∗(x) + s∗.
Replacing the true problem (P1) by the first-order problem (P2) is a valid procedure
only if their solutions coincide. Assuming that the solutions to (P1) are interior with
respect to effort and saving, this will be the case if and only if the contracts solving (P2)
are incentive compatible. A sufficient condition for incentive compatibility is that the
agent’s decision problem is concave at those contracts. The remainder of this paper will
identify conditions under which this is the case.
3.3 A sufficient condition for concavity of the agent’s
problem
In this section, I validate the first-order approach using nonincreasing absolute risk
aversion, monotonicity of the wage scheme, and an assumption on the curvature of the
output distribution function. This procedure strengthens the classic approach of Mirrlees
(1979) and Rogerson (1985a).
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Using λ, µ and ξ as the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints (PC),
(FOCe), (FOCs), respectively, the first-order condition of the Lagrangian of problem
(P2) with respect to wages, for x ∈ [x, x], is
0 = −
1
R
f(x, e∗) + µβu′(c∗(x))fe(x, e
∗)− ξβu′′(c∗(x))f(x, e∗) + λβu′(c∗(x))f(x, e∗).
(3.2)
Equivalently, as shown by Abraham and Pavoni (2009),
1
Rβu′(c∗(x))
= λ+ µ
fe(x, e
∗)
f(x, e∗)
+ ξa(c∗(x)), x ∈ [x, x], (3.3)
where a(c) = −u′′(c)/u′(c) is A’s coefficient of absolute risk-aversion.
Expression (3.3) equates the principal’s costs and benefits of marginally increasing the
agent’s utility at output x, normalized by the probability density. Compared to the
standard moral hazard problem, there is now the additional term ξa(c∗(x)), because an
increase of u(c∗(x)) relaxes the agent’s Euler equation.5
I will often use the following two assumptions to give equation (3.3) more structure.
MLR. The likelihood ratio function, fe(x, e)/f(x, e), is continuously differentiable and
nondecreasing in output x for all effort levels e.
NIARA. The agent’s coefficient of absolute risk aversion, a(c) = −u′′(c)/u′(c), is con-
tinuously differentiable and nonincreasing in consumption c.
MLR is standard and simply means that more output is indicative of higher effort.
NIARA is also unproblematic, since it is satisfied by most common utility functions.
5Note that an increase of βu(c∗(x)) by one marginal unit costs the principal 1/(Rβu′(c∗(x))) units
of consumption. On the other hand, it generates a benefit of λ because the participation constraint
is relaxed and a benefit (or cost) of µfe/f because the first-order incentive constraint is relaxed (or
tightened). In addition, there is a benefit of ξa(c∗(x)) because an increase of βu(c∗(x)) mitigates the
agent’s wish to save (Abraham and Pavoni 2009).
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NIARA implies that the multipliers λ, µ, ξ in the Kuhn-Tucker condition (3.3) are pos-
itive: λ > 0, µ > 0, ξ > 0 (Abraham and Pavoni 2009). Moreover, MLR plus NIARA
is sufficient for the wage scheme w∗(x), with w∗(x) = c∗(x) − s∗, to be continuously
differentiable and nondecreasing in output x; see equation (3.3).6
As noted before, the first-order approach is valid if A’s objective function
(e, s) 7→ u(w0 −
s
R
) + β
∫ x
x
u(w∗(x) + s)f(x, e) dx− βv(e) (3.4)
is concave in (e, s) for the wage scheme w∗(·) that solves (P2). One can restrict attention
to A’s second-period consumption utility as the next result shows.
Lemma 3.1. A’s decision problem is concave in (e, s) if A’s second-period consumption
utility
(e, s) 7→
∫ x
x
u(w∗(x) + s)f(x, e) dx (3.5)
is concave in (e, s).
By focusing on A’s second-period consumption utility, I ignore the curvature generated
by the effort disutility function v and by the effect of saving on first-period utility. In
principle, one could obtain more general results by including these two effects. It is not
apparent, however, how far this would relax the curvature requirement imposed on the
agent’s second-period utility. Note, besides, that the role of the effort disutility function
is limited anyway, since effort units can always be normalized such that this function is
linear.
The following lemma identifies a sufficient condition for concavity of (3.5).
6NIARA can be relaxed. Equation (3.3) implies that w∗(·) is nondecreasing under MLR if −(u′′′u′−
(u′′)2) ≤ −u′′(Rβξ)−1. This requires that the coefficient of absolute risk aversion does not increase too
quickly.
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Lemma 3.2. Suppose w∗(·) is continuously differentiable and nondecreasing. Suppose
the distribution function of output, F (x, e) =
∫ x
x
f(z, e) dz, is convex in e and for all
x ∈ [x, x], e ∈ I, s ∈ J , we have
Fee(x, e)F (x, e)
(Fe(x, e))2
u′′′(w∗(x) + s)u′(w∗(x) + s)
(u′′(w∗(x) + s))2
≥ 1. (3.6)
Then A’s second-period consumption utility is concave in (e, s).
To understand condition (3.6), note that FeeF/(Fe)
2 is nonnegative if and only if F is
convex in e, and at least 1 if and only F is log-convex in e.7 Hence, FeeF/(Fe)
2 measures
the convexity of the distribution function F as a function effort. This motivates the
following concept.
LCDF. The distribution function of output, F (x, e) =
∫ x
x
f(z, e) dz, is log-convex in
effort e for all output levels x.
A necessary but not sufficient condition for LCDF is that the distribution function
is convex in effort. Hence, LCDF tightens the CDF condition from Mirrlees (1979)
and Rogerson (1985a). To interpret LCDF, note that F (x′, e) equals 1 − P (x > x′|e).
Therefore, stating that F (x′, e) is log-convex in effort implies that the probability P (x >
x′|e) is ‘strongly’ concave in effort. For this reason, LCDF requires that the (stochastic)
returns to effort are strongly decreasing: The probability P (x > x′|e) that output is
larger than some level x′ is strongly concave in the agent’s effort choice e for all values
of x′.
Analogous to the interpretation of FeeF/(Fe)
2, note that u′′′u′/(u′′)2 is a measure of
convexity of A’s marginal utility of consumption. This measure is nonnegative if and
only if u′ is convex, and at least 1 if and only if u′ is log-convex. Log-convexity of u′ is
7A function f : R → R++ is called log-convex if the logarithm of that function is convex. Assuming
differentiability, f is log-convex if and only if f ′′f/(f ′)2 ≥ 1. Any log-convex function is convex, but
not vice versa.
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equivalent to
u′′′u′ − (u′′)2
(u′)2
≥ 0. (3.7)
This is the case if and only if
d
dc
(
−
u′′(c)
u′(c)
)
≤ 0. (3.8)
Hence, log-convexity of u′ is equivalent to NIARA.
The main result is now a direct consequence of these observations: MLR, NIARA and
LCDF validate the first-order approach.
Theorem 3.1. Let (w∗(·), e∗, s∗) be a solution to the first-order problem (P2). Suppose
MLR, NIARA and LCDF. Then, given this contract, the agent’s decision problem is
concave. Hence, the contract solves the original problem (P1).
Compared to the model without hidden saving, Theorem 3.1 additionally requires NIARA
and LCDF instead of Rogerson’s (1985a) CDF condition. NIARA is unproblematic, be-
cause it is satisfied by most common utility functions and confirmed by many empirical
and experimental studies. As argued above, LCDF states that the returns to effort are
strongly decreasing in a particular sense. The following examples, in particular the case
with only two possible output levels, clarify this property.
Example 3.1 (Rogerson 1985). Rogerson’s paper contains the following distribution
function that is convex in effort and satisfies MLR:
F (x, e) =
(x
x
)e−e
, x ∈ [0, x], e ∈ (e,∞). (3.9)
This distribution function is not only convex in e, but even satisfies LCDF. Note
log(F (x, e)) = (e− e) log
(x
x
)
, (3.10)
which shows that F (x, e) is log-linear in e for all i.
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Example 3.2 (Log-logistic distribution). Let 0 < b ≤ 1. Consider the following distri-
bution function:
F (x, e) =
1
1 + (e/x)b
, x ∈ [0,∞), e ∈ (0,∞). (3.11)
It is not difficult to see that MLR is satisfied. Moreover, note
log(F (x, e)) = − log
(
1 + (e/x)b
)
. (3.12)
Since b ≤ 1, the expression (e/x)b is concave in e. Since the logarithm is increasing and
concave, equation (3.12) shows that log(F (x, e)) is convex in e. Thus, LCDF is satisfied.
The next two examples apply to discrete output spaces X = {x1, . . . , xn}, xi < xj for
i < j. In this setup, wages are vectors (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ R
n, and probability weights
(p1(e), . . . , pn(e)) replace the density function f(x, e). The previous results extend to
the discrete setup without difficulty.
Example 3.3 (Two outputs). Consider the case with two possible outputs, xL < xH ,
and associated probabilities pL(e) = 1−p(e), pH(e) = p(e), for some increasing function
p with 0 ≤ p(e) ≤ 1. Since p is increasing, MLR is satisfied. LCDF is equivalent to the
log-convexity of 1− p(e), which holds if and only if
−p′′(e)(1− p(e))
(p′(e))2
≥ 1 for all e ∈ I. (3.13)
To yield LCDF, the probability p(e) of the high output level thus has to be sufficiently
concave in effort. One example that satisfies this condition is the function p(e) =
1− exp(−f(e)), where f : I → (0,∞) is increasing and concave.
Example 3.4 (Spanning condition). Let (π1h, . . . , πnh), (π1l, . . . , πnl) be two probability
distributions on {x1, . . . , xn} such that πih/πil is nondecreasing in i. (This implies that
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πh first-order stochastically dominates πl.) Let
pi(e) = Γ(e)πih + (1− Γ(e))πil (3.14)
for some increasing function Γ, with 0 ≤ Γ(e) ≤ 1. Monotonicity of Γ, combined with
the fact that πih/πil is nondecreasing, yields MLR. Note
Fi(e) = F (xi, e) =
i∑
j=1
pj(e) = (1− Γ(e))
i∑
j=1
(πil − πih) +
i∑
j=1
πih. (3.15)
First-order stochastic dominance implies
∑i
j=1(πil − πih) ≥ 0. Therefore, LCDF holds
if 1− Γ(e) is log-convex. This requirement is equivalent to
(Γ′(e))2
−Γ′′(e)(1− Γ(e))
≤ 1, (3.16)
which is exactly the condition under which Abraham and Pavoni (2009) validate the
first-order approach for the spanning condition and NIARA utility. Their proof relies
heavily on the spanning condition and there is no obvious way how it might generalize
to the setting considered in this paper. Moreover, Abraham and Pavoni’s reading of the
property in (3.16) is that the Frisch elasticity of leisure must not be larger than one
(Abraham and Pavoni 2009, p. 16). This does not capture the true sense in which (3.16)
tightens the CDF condition from Mirrlees (1979) and Rogerson (1985a), in contrast to
the argument provided in the present paper.
3.4 Alternative sufficient conditions for concavity
In this section, I discuss a few important relaxations of the assumptions made in The-
orem 3.1. First, I study the case of CRRA utility functions. Then, I exploit curvature
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properties of the wage scheme. Note that, so far, the results have only used monotonicity
of the wage scheme.
3.4.1 CRRA utility
Recall that the two crucial assumptions from Theorem 3.1, LCDF and NIARA, are
strong convexity conditions for the distribution function and the agent’s marginal utility
of consumption, respectively. As Lemma 3.2 highlights, each of the conditions can be
relaxed by strengthening the other. This insight is useful, because in many cases we do
not only have log-convexity of the agent’s marginal utility of consumption (NIARA),
but stronger results.
The following proposition is a formal statement of this idea. It relaxes the LCDF prop-
erty by restricting the class of preferences.
Proposition 3.1. Let (w∗(·), e∗, s∗) be a solution to the first-order problem (P2). Sup-
pose MLR and NIARA. Suppose there exists a number η > 1 such that for all c
u′′′(c)u′(c)
(u′′(c))2
≥ η, (3.17)
and for all e ∈ I, x ∈ [x, x],
Fee(x, e)F (x, e)
(Fe(x, e))2
≥
1
η
. (3.18)
Then, given this contract, the agent’s decision problem is concave. Hence, the contract
solves the original problem (P1).
Note that the right-hand side of (3.18) is a number between 0 and 1. Thus, the convexity
requirement for the distribution function is somewhere between Rogerson’s (1985a) CDF
condition and the LCDF property introduced in Theorem 3.1.8
8Clearly, we cannot expect to obtain a better condition than CDF in the present setup, given the
counterexample by Kocherlakota (2004).
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As an important application of Proposition 3.1, consider CRRA utility: u(c) = c1−γ/(1−
γ). Then we have
u′′′(c)u′(c)
(u′′(c))2
= 1 +
1
γ
. (3.19)
Hence, using Proposition 3.1, we conclude that the first-order approach is valid if for all
e ∈ I, x ∈ [x, x],
Fee(x, e)F (x, e)
(Fe(x, e))2
≥
γ
1 + γ
. (3.20)
Under the spanning condition from Example 3.4, for instance, this property is equivalent
to
(Γ′(e))2
−Γ′′(e)(1− Γ(e))
≤ 1 +
1
γ
for all e ∈ I. (3.21)
This relaxes condition (3.16).
3.4.2 Exploiting the curvature of the contract
To validate the first-order approach, I have previously derived conditions on the output
distribution and the agent’s preferences under which, given that the contract is mono-
tonic in output, the agent’s decision problem is concave. Finding such conditions will
be much simpler if the contract is not only monotonic, but also exhibits some form of
concavity. For the moral hazard problem without hidden saving, Jewitt (1988) provides
a general analysis of this idea. He shows that, under quite general conditions, the agent’s
utility changes with output in a concave way, and therefore the convexity conditions on
the distribution function can be substantially relaxed.
In the present subsection, I try to exploit the curvature of the contract in the context
of hidden saving.
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Integration of the distribution function
For the standard moral hazard problem, Jewitt (1988, Theorem 1) validates the first-
order approach when the agent’s (ex-post) utility u(w∗(x)) is concave in output x and
the integral of the distribution function satisfies a convexity property. He then relates
the latter property to the concept of Total Positivity (Karlin 1968) and shows that it is
satisfied for a rather general class of probability distributions. In the setup with hidden
saving, such a result is more difficult to obtain. Since the agent’s consumption level
can be changed by saving, one needs to specify not only the curvature between utility
and output, but also how this curvature changes with the savings level s. I obtain the
following result.9
Proposition 3.2. Let (w∗(·), e∗, s∗) be a solution to the first-order problem (P2). Sup-
pose MLR and NIARA. Suppose that for all output levels x
−
d2(u(w∗(x) + s))
dx2
is positive and log-convex in saving s, (C1)
F˜ (x, e) =
∫ x
x
F (z, e) dz is log-convex in effort e. (LCI)
Then, given this contract, the agent’s decision problem is concave. Hence, the contract
solves the original problem (P1).
Unfortunately, there is no simple way of expressing condition (C1) in terms of the fun-
damentals of the model. However, it is easy to see that (C1) is a concavity property of
the contract: A’s (ex-post) consumption utility, u(w∗(x)+s)), depends on output x in a
concave way. In addition, the curvature between utility and output changes with saving
s in a log-convex way.
The next result shows that (C1) is satisfied if the wage scheme w∗(x) is concave in output
9To facilitate the argument, I suppose that the wage scheme is twice continuously differentiable.
As the Kuhn-Tucker condition (3.3) shows, the wage scheme w∗(x) = c∗(x) − s∗ will be C2 in x if
fe(x, e)/f(x, e) is C
2 in x and u′(c), a(c) are C2 in c.
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x. Hence, (C1) is guaranteed under an appropriate concavity property of the likelihood
ratio function fe(x, e)/f(x, e); see the appendix for details.
Lemma 3.3. Suppose NIARA and suppose −u′′′(c)/u′′(c) is nonincreasing in c. Then
condition (C1) is necessary but not sufficient for w∗(x) to be concave in x.
The assumption that −u′′′(c)/u′′(c) is nonincreasing in c (nonincreasing absolute pru-
dence) is innocuous. For instance, it is satisfied for all utility functions with hyperbolic
absolute risk aversion (HARA).
To capture the second condition in Proposition 3.2, it is important to note that log-
convexity is preserved under integration (Boyd and Vandenberghe 2004, p. 106). There-
fore, log-convexity of the integral F˜ (x, e) =
∫ x
x
F (z, e) dz is a weaker assumption than
log-convexity of F (x, e) (LCDF). Intuitively, the integral F˜ (x, e) will be log-convex in e
if the distribution function F (x, e) is log-convex in e for small values of x and “not too
misbehaved” for large values of x. In fact, F (x, e) does not even have to be convex in e
as the following example shows.
Example 3.5 (Beta Prime distribution). Consider the Beta Prime distribution with
parameter b = 2:
f(x, e) =
xe−1(1 + x)−e−2
B(e, 2)
, x ∈ [0,∞), e ∈ (0,∞), (3.22)
where B(e, b) represents the Beta function. The likelihood ratio function fe(x, e)/f(x, e)
is nondecreasing concave in x, hence the class of preferences satisfying (C1) is nonempty.
The distribution function is
F (x, e) = (1 + e+ x)xe(1 + x)−e−1. (3.23)
It is easy to see that F (x, e) is not convex in e for all x. However, the integral of the
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distribution function,
F˜ (x, e) = x
(
x
1 + x
)e
, (3.24)
is log-linear in e. Therefore, LCI is satisfied.
Given this example, Proposition 3.2 even validates the first-order approach for a class
of setups where the distribution function is not convex in effort. However, the gain of
Proposition 3.2 in terms of relaxing the LCDF condition is limited. It is difficult to find
many other examples that satisfy LCI without satisfying LCDF. In addition, condition
(C1) is a stronger requirement than concavity of the agent’s utility in output. Hence,
compared to Jewitt’s (1988) Theorem 1, it is much more difficult to relax the convexity
properties of the distribution function in the present framework.
Quasiconvex distribution functions
To exploit the curvature of contracts, it is often helpful to study distribution functions
that are (jointly) quasiconvex in output and effort, because, roughly speaking, such
distributions are equivalent to production functions with nonincreasing returns to scale.
For instance, Jewitt (1988, Theorem 3) and Conlon (2009) use this property to validate
the first-order approach for multi-signal moral hazard problems. In the present section,
I show that quasiconvex distribution functions also have attractive properties for the
model with hidden saving.
Recall that, to establish concavity of the agent’s decision problem, it is sufficient to
consider the agent’s utility in the second period (Lemma 3.1). Moreover, note that
the distribution function F (x, e) is quasiconvex in (x, e) if and only if output can be
represented by a ‘production function’ x = ϕ(e, z) that is nondecreasing concave in e
and nondecreasing in the stochastic state of nature z (Jewitt 1988, Lemma 2). Using
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the production function, we can write the agent’s second-period utility as
∫ x
x
u(w∗(x) + s)f(x, e) dx = E[u(w∗(ϕ(e, z)) + s)], (3.25)
where E[·] denotes expectations with respect to the state of nature z. Now, notice that
concavity is preserved under summation and under nondecreasing concave transforma-
tions. Hence, since u is nondecreasing concave, the agent’s decision problem will be
concave in (e, b) if w∗(ϕ(e, z)) is concave in e for all z.10 This insight is key for the
following result.
Proposition 3.3. Let (w∗(·), e∗, s∗) be a solution to the first-order problem (P2). Sup-
pose that the following conditions hold:
F (x, e) is quasiconvex in (x, e), (3.26)
fe(x, e)/f(x, e) is nondecreasing and concave in x for all e, (3.27)
g(c) :=
(
1
Rβu′(c)
− ξa(c)
)
is increasing and convex in c. (3.28)
Then, given this contract, the agent’s decision problem is concave. Hence, the contract
solves the original problem (P1).
The function g defined in (3.28) links the likelihood ratio function fe(y, e)/f(y, e) to the
shape of the wage scheme: Recall the Kuhn-Tucker condition (3.3),
1
Rβu′(c∗(x))
= λ+ µ
fe(x, e
∗)
f(x, e∗)
+ ξa(c∗(x)), x ∈ [x, x]. (3.29)
10At first glance, this insight seems to suggest that the validity of the first-order approach is not
affected by the introduction of hidden saving. Notice, however, that the shape of the wage scheme is
crucially influenced by the agent’s ability to save; see equation (3.3).
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Hence, the wage scheme w∗(x) = c∗(x)− s∗ is characterized by
w∗(x) = g−1
(
λ+ µ
fe(x, e
∗)
f(x, e∗)
)
− s∗, x ∈ [x, x]. (3.30)
Thus, since g−1 is nondecreasing concave under assumption (3.28), concave likelihood
ratio functions will generate concave wage schemes w∗(x) in this case.
As an important application of Proposition 3.3, consider CARA utility:
u(c) = − exp(−αc)/α.
Then we have g(c) = (Rβ)−1 exp(αc) − ξα. Obviously, this function is increasing and
convex in c. Therefore, Proposition 3.3 validates the first-order approach for CARA
utility when the distribution function F (x, e) is quasiconvex in (x, e) and the likelihood
ratio function fe(x, e)/f(x, e) is nondecreasing concave in x.
11
There are other examples, such as CRRA utility, for which g is not convex, however. In
that case, the concavity property of the likelihood ratio function formulated in (3.27)
has to be strengthened to obtain a concave wage scheme; the details can be found in
the appendix. Essentially, the difficulty in obtaining concave wage schemes is driven
by the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, which tends to make the right-hand side
of the optimality condition (3.29) less concave in x. This result is also important for
the characterization of optimal contracts and hints that wages become a more convex
function of output under hidden saving.12
11In the present paper, preferences over consumption and effort are additively separable. For CARA
utility and multiplicatively separable preferences, by contrast, the validation of the first-order approach
becomes much simpler, since the agent’s effort choice will be independent of his wealth level. For most
applications, this does not seem to be a useful approximation, however.
12See Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of this insight.
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3.5 Concluding remarks
This paper validates the first-order approach for two-period moral hazard problems with
hidden saving. Compared to the model without hidden saving, I additionally impose
an assumption on the convexity of the agent’s marginal utility of consumption and a
restriction of Rogerson’s (1985a) CDF condition. I obtain alternative sets of sufficient
conditions by relaxing the latter property and including conditions on the curvature of
the wage scheme.
These results show under what conditions the first-order approach can be safely applied.
Besides, they indicate that the approach is slightly less general than in the standard
moral hazard problem. Therefore, understanding how to characterize optimal contracts
without applying the first-order approach could be a useful complement to the present
work. Given the findings by Grossman and Hart (1983), however, such an approach will
also involve strong structural assumptions in general.
3.A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.1. A’s objective function is
(e, s) 7→ u(w0 −
s
R
) + β
∫ x
x
u(w∗(x) + s)f(x, e) dx− βv(e). (3.31)
Since u is concave, the first summand is concave in (e, s). Since v is convex, the third
summand is concave in (e, s).
Proof of Lemma 3.2. Using partial integration, A’s second-period consumption utility
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can be rewritten as
∫ x
x
u(w∗(x) + s)f(x, e) dx = u(w∗(x) + s)−
∫ x
x
(w∗)′(x)u′(w∗(x) + s)F (x, e) dx.
(3.32)
Hence, A’s second-period consumption utility is concave in (e, s) if the function
(e, s) 7→ −
∫ x
x
(w∗)′(x)u′(w∗(x) + s)F (x, e) dx (3.33)
is concave, or equivalently if the function
(e, s) 7→
∫ x
x
(w∗)′(x)u′(w∗(x) + s)F (x, e) dx (3.34)
is convex. I want to show that
g(e, s;x) = u′(w∗(x) + s)F (x, e) (3.35)
is convex in (e, s) for all x. Since (w∗)′(x) ≥ 0 by assumption, and since convexity is
preserved under integration, this will imply convexity of (3.34).
The function g(e, s;x) is convex in (e, s) if and only if its Hessian has a nonnegative
diagonal and a nonnegative determinant. Omitting all arguments, the Hessian equals
H =

Feeu′ Feu′′
Feu
′′ Fu′′′

 . (3.36)
The first diagonal entry is nonnegative by assumption. Condition (3.6) is equivalent
to the statement that the determinant of H is nonnegative. In that case, the second
diagonal entry of H must also be nonnegative.
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Proof of Theorem 3.1. By Lemma 3.1, it is sufficient to establish concavity of A’s second-
period consumption utility. Due to MLR and NIARA, the Kuhn-Tucker condition (3.3)
implies that the wage scheme w∗(x) = c∗(x) − s∗ is continuously differentiable and
nondecreasing in output x. Moreover, LCDF and NIARA imply that condition (3.6) from
Lemma 3.2 is satisfied. Hence, A’s second-period consumption utility is concave.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Using similar steps as in the proof of Theorem 3.1, the result
follows from Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. As Lemma 3.1 shows, it is sufficient to establish concavity of
(e, s) 7→
∫ x
x
u(w∗(x) + s)f(x, e) dx. (3.37)
This is equivalent to establishing convexity of
(e, s) 7→ −
∫ x
x
u(w∗(x) + s)f(x, e) dx. (3.38)
Using two steps of partial integration, the latter function can be rewritten as
−u(w∗(x) + s) + (w∗)′(x)u′(w∗(x) + s))F˜ (x, e) +
∫ x
x
(
−
d2(u(w∗(x) + s))
dx2
)
F˜ (x, e) dx.
(3.39)
First, note that the expression −u(w∗(x) + s) is convex in (e, s) due to the concavity of
u. Moreover, the expression
(w∗)′(x)u′(w∗(x) + s))F˜ (x, e) (3.40)
is convex in (e, s) by an argument similar to Lemma 3.2. For the third term in (3.39),
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note that
−
d2(u(w∗(x) + s))
dx2
F˜ (x, e) (3.41)
is the product of a function that is log-convex in s and a function that is log-convex in
e. Such products are convex in (e, s) as one easily verifies. Since convexity is preserved
under integration, the third term in (3.39) is thus convex as well. This completes the
proof.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. Suppose w∗(x) is concave in x. The function studied in (C1) can
be represented as
−
d2(u(w∗(x) + s))
dx2
= −(w∗)′′(x)u′(w∗(x) + s) + ((w∗)′(x))
2
(−u′′(w∗(x) + s)) . (3.42)
The first summand in (3.42) is log-convex in s, since −(w∗)′′(x) ≥ 0 and since u′ is log-
convex due to NIARA. The second summand is log-convex in s, since ((w∗)′(x))2 ≥ 0 and
since −u′′ is log-convex when −u′′′/u′′ is nonincreasing. Since log-convexity is preserved
under summation (Boyd and Vandenberghe 2004, p. 105), the function studied in (C1)
is therefore log-convex in the variable s.
On the other hand, suppose that the function studied in (C1) is log-convex in s. As
(3.42) shows, this does not imply that (w∗)′′(x) is nonpositive in general.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. By Lemma 3.1, it is sufficient to consider A’s second-period
consumption utility. Moreover, due to quasiconvexity of the distribution function, the
output technology can be represented by a production function x = ϕ(e, z), with ϕ(e, z)
nondecreasing concave in effort e and nondecreasing in the stochastic state of nature
z (Jewitt 1988, Lemma 2). Using this representation, we can write A’s second-period
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consumption utility as
∫ x
x
u(w∗(x) + s)f(x, e) dx = E[u(w∗(ϕ(e, z)) + s)], (3.43)
where E[·] denotes expectations with respect to the state of nature z.
I claim that w∗ is nondecreasing concave. Recall from the Kuhn-Tucker condition (3.3)
that solutions to (P2) are characterized by
w∗(x) = g−1
(
λ+ µ
fe(x, e
∗)
f(x, e∗)
)
− s∗, (3.44)
with g(c) = 1/(Rβu′(c)) − ξa(c). By assumption, g is increasing and convex. Equiva-
lently, g−1 is increasing and concave. Since fe(x, e
∗)/f(x, e∗) is nondecreasing concave
in x by assumption, this implies that w∗(x) is nondecreasing concave in x.
Now, since ϕ(e, z) is concave in e and w∗(x) is nondecreasing concave in x, the com-
position w∗(ϕ(e, z)) is concave in e. Hence, the function w∗(ϕ(e, z)) + s is concave in
(e, s). Since u is nondecreasing concave, and since concavity is preserved under taking
expectations, this completes the proof.
3.B Appendix: Concave wage schemes
This section characterizes when the consumption scheme c∗(x) solving the first-order
problem (P2) is concave in output x. Since w∗(x) = c∗(x)−s∗, this property is equivalent
to the wage scheme w∗(x) being concave in x.
Due to equation (3.3), the consumption scheme is characterized by
c∗(x) = g−1 (λ+ µL(x)) , (3.45)
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with g(c) = 1/(Rβu′(c)) − ξa(c), L(x) = fe(x, e
∗)/f(x, e∗) . The first derivative of g
equals
g′(c) =
ξu′′′(c)u′(c)− ((Rβ)−1 + ξu′′(c))u′′(c)
u′(c)2
, (3.46)
which yields
(c∗)′(x) =
µL′(x)u′(c∗(x))2
ξu′′′(c∗(x))u′(c∗(x))− ((Rβ)−1 + ξu′′(c∗(x)))u′′(c∗(x))
. (3.47)
Omitting the arguments x and c∗(x), the latter implies
(c∗)′′(x) =
µ
(. . . )2
[ (
L′′(u′)2 + 2L′u′′u′(c∗)′
) (
ξu′′′u′ − ((Rβ)−1 + ξu′′)u′′
)
− L′(u′)2(c∗)′
(
ξu(4)u′ − ((Rβ)−1 + ξu′′)u′′′
) ]
.
(3.48)
Hence, given the assumption
(u′)2[ξ(u′′′u′ − (u′′)2)− u′′(Rβ)−1] > 0, (3.49)
which is true under NIARA, c∗(x) is concave in x if and only if the likelihood ratio
function satisfies the following concavity condition:
L′′(x) ≤
L′(c∗)′
(u′)2[ξ(u′′′u′ − (u′′)2)− u′′(Rβ)−1]
[
2ξu′(−u′′)(u′′′u′ − (u′′)2) + 2u′(u′′)2(Rβ)−1
+ ξ(u′)2(−u′′)u′′′ + ξ(u′)3u(4) − (u′)2u′′′(Rβ)−1
]
.
(3.50)
Chapter 4
Optimal income taxation with asset
accumulation
4.1 Introduction
The progressivity of the income tax code is a central question in the economic literature
and the public debate. While we observe progressive tax systems in most developed
countries nowadays, theoretical insights on progressivity are rather limited. Previous
research has examined how the optimal degree of progressivity depends on the skill
distribution (Mirrlees 1971), the welfare criterion (Sadka 1976), and earnings elasticities
(Saez 2001).
The existing approaches to income tax progressivity have largely focused on models
where labor is the only source of income. However, we argue in the present paper that
the optimal shape of labor income taxes cannot be determined in isolation from the tax
code on capital income. Specifically, we show that taxing capital has an important effect
on the optimal progressivity of labor income taxes: When capital is taxed, the optimal
tax on labor income becomes more progressive.
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We derive this result in a two-period model of social insurance. A continuum of ex-
ante identical agents influence their labor incomes by exerting effort. Labor income
realizations are not perfectly controllable, which creates a moral hazard problem. Thus,
the social planner faces a trade-off between insuring the agents against idiosyncratic
income uncertainty on the one hand and the associated disincentive effects on the other
hand. In addition, agents have access to a risk-free bond, which gives them a limited
means for self-insurance.
There is an efficiency reason for taxing bond returns in our model: The bond provides
insurance against the realization of labor income and thereby reduces the incentives to
exert effort. Consequently, the planner faces an additional constraint when determining
the optimal social insurance scheme, since she has to satisfy the agent’s Euler equation. If
the bond is appropriately taxed, however, the constraint becomes non-binding. Through
this channel, taxing the bond affects the structure of optimal labor income taxes. More
precisely, if the bond is not taxed, the planner needs to consider how the distribution
of after-tax income changes the agent’s saving motive in the previous period. We show
that, for a given income level, a local reduction in the tax rate affects the agent’s saving
motive according to his coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Since absolute risk aversion
is typically a convex function, we find that optimal after-tax income changes in a more
convex way with labor income when bond returns are not taxed. Equivalently, optimal
after-tax income changes in a more concave way when the bond is taxed, which means
that the tax on labor income becomes more progressive.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that examines how capital tax-
ation affects the optimal progressivity of the labor income tax code. Recent work on
dynamic Mirrleesian taxation models has highlighted a somewhat complementary ques-
tion. Kocherlakota (2005), Albanesi and Sleet (2006), and Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006)
focus on the optimal taxation of capital, given nonlinear taxation of income. In that
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literature, the reason for capital taxation is similar to our model and stems from disin-
centive effects associated with the accumulation of wealth.1
While the Mirrlees (1971) framework focuses on redistribution in a population with
heterogeneous skills, our approach highlights the social insurance (or ex-post redistri-
bution) aspect of income taxation. In spirit, our model is therefore closer to the works
by Varian (1980) and Eaton and Rosen (1980). The main reason for excluding ex-ante
redistribution in the present paper is tractability. Conesa and Krueger (2006) study
optimal taxation numerically when both redistribution and social insurance motives are
present. However, they consider a restricted class of tax schemes. In particular, they do
not distinguish between the taxation of labor income and capital. The present model is
simpler in some dimensions, but allows us to analytically explore the fully optimal tax
scheme.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the setup of the model. Section 3
presents the main result of the paper: Capital taxation increases the progressivity of
the optimal income tax code. In Section 4, we explore alternative concepts of concav-
ity/progressivity. Section 5 concludes and discusses some directions for future research.
All proofs are provided in the appendix.
4.2 Model
Consider a benevolent social planner (the principal) whose objective is to maximize
the welfare of the citizens. The (small open) economy contains a continuum of ex-
ante identical agents who live for two periods, t = 0, 1, and can influence their date-1
income realizations by working hard or shirking. The planner offers a tax/transfer system
1However, the tax on capital takes a much simpler form in our model: a linear tax on the aggregate
trade of the bond is sufficient to implement the second best; compare Gottardi and Pavoni (2010).
Notice, in particular, that this tax can be implemented in an anonymous asset market where the
planner only observes the aggregate trading volume.
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to insure them against idiosyncratic risk and provide them appropriate incentives for
working hard. The planner’s budget must be (intertemporally) balanced.
4.2.1 Preferences
The agent derives utility from consumption ct ≥ c ≥ −∞ and effort ∞ ≥ e¯ ≥ et ≥
0 according to: u(ct) − v(et), where both u and v are strictly increasing and twice
continuously differentiable functions, and u is strictly concave whereas v is convex. We
normalize v(0) = 0. The agent’s discount factor is denoted by β > 0.
4.2.2 Production and endowments
At date t = 0, the agent has a fixed endowment y0. At date t = 1, the agent has a
stochastic income y ∈ Y := [y, y]. The realization of y is publicly observable, while the
probability distribution over Y is affected by the agent’s unobservable effort level e0 that
is exerted at t = 0. The probability density of this distribution is given by the smooth
function f(y, e0). As in most of the the optimal contracting literature, we assume full
support, that is f(y, e0) > 0 for all y, e0. There is no production or any other action at
t ≥ 2.
4.2.3 Markets
At each date, the agent can buy or (short)-sell a risk-free bond bt which costs q ≥ 0
consumption units today and pays one unit of consumption tomorrow. The agent has no
access to any insurance market other than that delivered by the planner. The planner
can impose a linear tax τ k on the price of the bond.2 Therefore, the net price of the
bond is q˜ = (1 + τ k)q.
2A tax on the bond price is equivalent to a tax on the return in our model.
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There are two ways of motivating the linearity assumption of the tax τ k. First, the
planner only needs to observe the aggregate trade of the bond in order to implement
such a tax. Therefore, the tax is feasible even in an anonymous market where individual
asset decisions and consumption levels are private information. Second, linearity is in
fact without loss of generality in the present model, since the planner is able to generate
the second best with such a tax (see Proposition 4.1).
Given the structure of the problem, the agent will never be able to borrow at t = 1,
hence we have b1 ≥ 0. Monotonicity of preferences guarantees that the agent will not
want to leave any positive amount of assets at date 1 either. So, b1 = 0 for all states y.
Similarly, since v is strictly increasing, e1 = 0 for all states y.
4.2.4 Contracts
A contract W := (T , τ k, e0, b0) consists of a tax/transfer scheme T , a tax rate on
the bond τ k, and choices (e0, b0). The tax/transfer scheme T := (T0, T (·)) has two
components: T0 denotes the transfer the individual receives in period t = 0, and T (y),
y ∈ Y , denotes the transfer the individual receives in period t = 1 conditional on income
realization y.
Given a contract W , the agent’s utility is
U(e0, b0;T , τ
k) := u(y0 + T0 − (1 + τ
k)qb0)− v(e0) + β
∫ y
y
u(y + T (y) + b0)f(y, e0) dy.
To guarantee solvency of the agent for every contingency, we impose the ‘natural’ bor-
rowing limit: b0 ≥ c− infy {y + T (y)}.
The social planner faces the same credit market as the agent, therefore her discount rate
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is q. The planner’s expenditures are
T0 + q
∫ y
y
T (y)f(y, e0) dy − τ
kqb0 +G,
where G denotes government consumption.
4.2.5 Efficiency
An optimal contract is a contract that maximizes ex-ante welfare
max
W
U(e0, b0;T , τ
k) (4.1)
subject to the planner’s budget constraint
−T0 − q
∫ y
y
T (y)f(y, e0) dy + τ
kqb0 −G ≥ 0 (4.2)
and the incentive compatibility constraint
(e0, b0) ∈ arg
{
max
e,b
U(e, b;T , τ k) s.t. e ≥ 0, y0 + T0 − c ≥ q˜b ≥ −q˜ inf
y
{y + T (y)− c}
}
.
(4.3)
Note that there is indeterminacy in the contract between T0 and b0. The planner can
implement the same allocation with a contract
(
T0, T (·), τ
k, e0, b0
)
and with a contract (
T0 − q˜ε, T (·) + ε, τ
k, e0, b0 − ε
)
.
In other words, since the planner and the agent face the same credit market, there is a
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continuum of optimal contracts. Throughout this paper, without loss of generality, we
will study the one specific optimal contract that implements b0 = 0. Because of these
observations, we will sometimes refer to the combination of e0, τ
k, and c = (c0, c(·)),
with c0 := y0 + T0, c(y) := y + T (y), y ∈ Y , as a contract.
4.2.6 First-order approach
Throughout this paper, we assume that the first-order approach (FOA) is justified.
Hence, we can replace the incentive constraint (4.3) by the first-order conditions of the
agent’s maximization problem with respect to e0 and b0. Sufficient conditions for the
validity of the FOA in this setup are given in Chapter 3 of this thesis. Specifically, the
FOA is valid if the agent has nonincreasing absolute risk aversion and the cumulative
distribution function of income is log-convex in effort.3
Using the normalization b0 = 0 and the notation q˜ = (1 + τ
k)q, c0 = y0 + T0, c(y) =
y + T (y), y ∈ Y , we can thus rewrite the planner’s problem as
max
c,q˜,e0
u(c0)− v(e0) + β
∫ y
y
u(c(y))f(y, e0) dy (4.4)
subject to c0 ≥ c, c(y) ≥ c, e0 ≥ 0, the planner’s budget constraint
y0 − c0 + q
∫ y
y
(y − c(y))f(y, e0) dy −G ≥ 0 (4.5)
3As argued by Abraham, Koehne, and Pavoni (2010), both conditions have quite a broad empirical
support. First, virtually all estimations for u reveal NIARA; see Guiso and Paiella (2008) for example.
Second, while the condition on the distribution function cannot be taken to the data directly, the
authors show that it can be interpreted as a restriction on the agent’s Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
This restriction is satisfied as long as the Frisch elasticity is smaller than unity. In fact, most empirical
studies find values of this elasticity between 0 and 0.5; see Domeij and Floden (2006), for instance.
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and the first-order incentive conditions
− v′(e0) + β
∫ y
y
u(c(y))fe(y, e0) dy ≥ 0 (4.6)
q˜u′(c0)− β
∫ y
y
u′(c(y))f(y, e0) dy ≥ 0. (4.7)
Under mild assumptions, the optimal contract is interior: c0 > c, c(y) > c, e0 > 0.
4 In
this case, using λ, µ and ξ as the (nonnegative) Lagrange multipliers associated with the
constraints (4.5), (4.6), (4.7), respectively, the first-order conditions of the Lagrangian
with respect to consumption are
λq
βu′(c(y))
= 1 + µ
fe(y, e0)
f(y, e0)
+ ξa(c(y)), y ∈ [y, y], (4.8)
λ
u′(c0)
= 1− ξq˜a(c0), (4.9)
where a(c) := −u′′(c)/u′(c) denotes the agent’s absolute risk aversion.
4.2.7 Preliminary characterization of optimal contracts
Because of the incentive problem, it is efficient to impose a positive tax on savings in
our model; compare Gottardi and Pavoni (2010).
Proposition 4.1. Assume that the FOA is justified and that the optimal contract is
interior. Then the tax on savings is positive: τ k > 0. Moreover, equations (4.8) and
(4.9) characterizing the consumption scheme are satisfied with ξ = 0.
The above result is intuitive. It is efficient to tax the bond, because saving provides
insurance against the incentive scheme. By appropriately reducing the rate of return,
however, the planner can control the agent’s intertemporal decision and therefore cir-
4A sufficient condition for interiority is limc→c u
′(c) =∞, v′(0) = 0.
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cumvent the (first-order) incentive constraint for saving.5 Consequently, when savings
can be taxed, condition (4.8) takes the form that is familiar from dynamic moral hazard
models without asset accumulation:
λq
βu′(c(y))
= 1 + µ
fe(y, e0)
f(y, e0)
, y ∈ [y, y].
Since we are interested in understanding how the shape of optimal consumption depends
on the possibility of taxing savings, we contrast the optimal contract when τ k is a choice
variable for the planner with the optimal contract when τ k is restricted to zero (i.e.,
q˜ = q).
Proposition 4.2. Consider the above problem with τ k restricted to zero. Assume that
the FOA is justified and that the optimal contract is interior. Then equations (4.8) and
(4.9) characterizing the consumption scheme are satisfied with ξ > 0.
4.3 Simple results
We are interested in the shape of the optimal tax/transfer scheme T . Clearly, this shape
is closely related to the curvature of consumption c(y) = y + T (y). Recall that we can
fix b0 = 0 without loss of generality.
Definition 4.1. We say that the transfer scheme T is progressive (regressive) if
c′(y) is decreasing (increasing) in y. We call T proportional if c′(y) is constant in y.
This definition implies that whenever consumption is a concave (convex) function of in-
come we have a progressive (regressive) tax system supporting it. In terms of the taxes
and transfers T (y), in a progressive system taxes (T (y) < 0) are increasing faster than
5The validity of the first-order approach is crucial here, since it allows to characterize the agent’s
saving decision exclusively based on the rate of return.
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income does. At the same time, for the states when the agent is receiving a transfer
(T (y) > 0), transfers are increasing slower than income is decreasing. The opposite
happens when we have a regressive scheme. Intuitively, if the scheme is progressive, in-
centives are provided more by imposing ‘large penalties’ for low income realizations, since
consumption decreases relatively quickly when income decreases. Regressive schemes,
by contrast, put more emphasis on rewards for high income levels than punishments for
low income levels. If the scheme is proportional, these rewards and punishments are
in some sense balanced. The next proposition provides conditions for progressivity and
regressivity of the optimal scheme.
Proposition 4.3 (Sufficient conditions for progressivity/regressivity). Assume that the
FOA is justified and that the optimal contract is interior.
(i) If the likelihood ratio function l (y, e) := fe(y,e)
f(y,e)
is concave in y and 1
u′(c)
is convex in
c, then T is progressive. If, in addition, absolute risk aversion a(c) is decreasing and
concave,6 then this result continues to hold when τ k is restricted to zero.
(ii) On the other hand, if l (y, e) is convex in y and 1
u′(c)
is concave in c, then T is
regressive. If, in addition, absolute risk aversion a(c) is decreasing and convex, then this
result continues to hold when τ k is restricted to zero.
Proposition 4.3 implies that CARA utilities with concave likelihood ratios lead to pro-
gressive schemes, no matter whether savings are taxed or not.7 When savings are taxed,
progressive schemes are also induced by concave likelihood ratios and CRRA utilities
with σ ≥ 1, since 1
u′(c)
= cσ is convex in this case. For logarithmic utility with linear
likelihood ratios we obtain a scheme that is proportional, since 1
u′(c)
= c is both concave
and convex. Interestingly, when savings are not taxed, the scheme becomes regressive
6Notice that absolute risk aversion is bounded below by zero. Therefore, the function a(·) can only
be decreasing and concave over [0,∞) if it is constant.
7Other cases where the tax on savings does not affect regressivity/progressivity are when a has the
same shape as 1
u′
(quadratic utility) and when a is linear (and hence increasing).
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in this case (since absolute risk aversion a(c) = 1
c
is convex).8 This particular finding
sheds light on a more general pattern under convex absolute risk aversion: when sav-
ings are taxed, the allocation has a ‘more concave’ relationship between income and
consumption. In other words, taxing savings calls for more progressivity in the income
tax/transfer system. The next result formalizes this insight.
Proposition 4.4 (Concavity). Assume that the FOA is justified. Let c be an interior,
monotonic optimal consumption scheme for the general model and let cˆ be an interior,
monotonic optimal consumption scheme for the model when τ k is restricted to zero, both
implementing effort level e0. Moreover, assume that u has convex absolute risk aversion
and that the likelihood ratio l (y, e0) is linear in y. Under these conditions, if cˆ changes
with y in a concave way, then c does as well.
In order to obtain a clearer intuition of this result, we further examine condition (4.8),
namely
λq
βu′(c(y))
= 1 + µ
fe(y, e0)
f(y, e0)
+ ξa(c(y)).
This expression equates the discounted present value (normalized by f (y, e0)) of the costs
and benefits of increasing the agent’s utility by one unit in state y. The increase in utility
costs q
βu′(c(y))
units in consumption terms. Multiplied by the shadow price of resources
λ, we obtain the left-hand side of the above expression. In terms of benefits, first of all,
since the agent’s utility is increased by one unit, there is a return of 1. Furthermore,
increasing the agent’s utility also relaxes the incentive constraint for effort, generating
a return of µfe(y,e0)
f(y,e0)
.9 Finally, by increasing u(c (y)) the planner alleviates the saving
motives of the agent. This gain, measured by ξa(c (y)), depends crucially on whether
savings are taxed or not. When savings are appropriately taxed, we have ξ = 0 and this
8More precisely, consumption is characterized by λq
β
c(y) − ξ 1
c(y) = 1 + µ l(y, e) in this case. Since
the left-hand side is concave in c and the right-hand side is linear in y, the consumption scheme c(y)
must be convex in y.
9Of course, if the increase in consumption is done in a state with a negative likelihood ratio, this
represents a cost since the incentive constraint is in fact tightened.
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gain vanishes. Intuitively, by controlling the net price of the bond, the planner is able to
circumvent the incentive constraint for saving. However, when a tax on savings is ruled
out, this constraint is binding and we have ξ > 0. Under convex absolute risk aversion,
the gain ξa(c (y)) is convex. This implies that, ceteris paribus, the benefits of increasing
the agent’s utility change in a more convex way with income. As a consequence, at the
optimal contract the costs of increasing the agent’s utility must also change in a more
convex way with income, hence consumption becomes more convex in y in this case.
4.4 More elaborate results
Since at least Holmstro¨m (1979), it is well understood that consumption patterns under
moral hazard are crucially influenced by the shape of the likelihood ratio function l(·, e).
Stated in more negative terms, one can always find functions l(·, e) so that the shape of
consumption is almost arbitrary. To make the impact of the savings tax on the shape
of optimal consumption easier to observe, we have therefore normalized the curvature
of the likelihood ratio by assuming linearity in Proposition 4.4.
In this section, we study how the savings tax changes the curvature of the consumption
scheme for arbitrary likelihood ratio functions. As usual, we assume that the FOA is
justified and that c and cˆ are interior, monotonic optimal contracts for the general model
and the model without the savings tax, respectively, implementing the same effort level
e0.
Probably the most well known ranking in terms of concavity in economics is that dictated
by concave transformations (e.g. Gollier 2001).
Definition 4.2. We say that f1 is a concave (convex) transformation of f2 if there is
an increasing and concave (convex) function v such that f1 = v ◦ f2.
Proposition 4.5. Assume that u has convex absolute risk aversion. Then, if cˆ is a
4.4 More elaborate results 83
concave transformation of l, then c is a concave transformation of l. Conversely, if c
is a convex transformation of l, then cˆ has the same property.
The previous finding induces an ordering that has the flavor of c being ‘more concave’
than cˆ. Note that this result generalizes Proposition 4.4 to arbitrary shapes of the
likelihood ratio function l. As a drawback, we can rank the curvature of c and cˆ only
when, for example, c is more concave than l. We will now reduce the set of possible
utility functions to facilitate such comparisons.
Let us consider the class of HARA (or linear risk tolerance) utility functions, namely
u (c) = ρ
(
η +
c
γ
)1−γ
with ρ
1− γ
γ
> 0, and η +
c
γ
> 0.
For this class, we have a(c) =
(
η + c
γ
)−1
. Hence, absolute risk aversion is convex. Special
cases of the HARA class are CRRA, CARA, and quadratic utility (e.g. Gollier 2001).
Lemma 4.1. Given a utility function u : C → R, consider the two functions defined as
follows:
gλ (c) :=
λq
βu′(c)
,
gˆλˆ,ξˆ (c) :=
λˆq
βu′(c)
− ξˆa(c).
Then, if u belongs to the HARA class with γ ≥ −1, then gˆλˆ,ξˆ is a concave transformation
of gλ for all λˆ, ξˆ ≥ 0, λ > 0.
The restriction γ ≥ −1 in the above result is innocuous and allows for all HARA func-
tions with nonincreasing absolute risk aversion as well as quadratic utility, for instance.
To state the consequences of this Lemma, we introduce the concept of G-convexity (e.g.
84 Optimal income taxation with asset accumulation
Avriel, Diewert, Schaible, and Zang 1988), which is widely used in optimization. A
function f is G-convex if once we transform f with G we get a convex function. More
formally:
Definition 4.3. Let f be a function and G an increasing function mapping from the
image of f to the real numbers. The function f is called G-convex (G-concave) if
G ◦ f is a convex (concave) function.
This concept generalizes the standard notion of convexity. It is easy to see that a function
f is convex if and only if it is G-convex for any increasing affine function G. Moreover,
it can be shown that if G is concave and f is G-convex then f must be convex, but the
converse is false.10
Proposition 4.6. Assume u belongs to the HARA class with γ ≥ −1. Then c is gλ-
convex (gλ-concave) if and only if cˆ is gˆλˆ,ξˆ-convex (gˆλˆ,ξˆ-concave).
11
Corollary 4.1. If cˆ is gλ-concave then c is gλ-concave. Conversely, if c is gλ-convex
then cˆ is gλ-convex.
The corollary shows that whenever cˆ satisfies the gλ-concavity property, then c satisfies
this property. In this sense, we note again that c is ‘more concave’ than cˆ.
Finally, it appears natural to ask whether the concavity of c and cˆ can also be ranked
according to the concavity notion of Definition 4.2. In other words, can we conclude
that c is a concave transformation of cˆ for HARA utility with γ ≥ −1 ? In general, the
answer is negative. After a small modification of the above lemma, it can be shown that
there exists a concave function h˜ such that c and cˆ are related as follows:
c(y) = g˜−1 ◦ h˜ ◦ g˜ (cˆ(y)) ,
10For example, suppose f (x) = x2 and G (·) = log (·) , then G(f(x)) = 2 log(x), which is obviously
not convex.
11In fact, this statement is not only true for concavity and convexity, but more generally for any
property defined with respect to the transformations gλ and gˆλˆ,ξˆ.
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where g˜(c) = 1
µ
(
λq
u′(c)
− 1
)
is increasing. If g˜ is an affine function (u is logarithmic
utility), then one can easily verify that the composition g˜−1 ◦ h˜ ◦ g˜ is concave whenever
h˜ is concave. For the logarithmic case, c is hence a concave transformation of cˆ. In
general, however, we cannot be sure that the composition g˜−1 ◦ h˜ ◦ g˜ is concave when h˜
is concave.12
4.5 Conclusion and outlook
This paper analyzes how capital taxation changes the optimal tax code on labor income.
Whenever preferences exhibit convex absolute risk aversion, we find that optimal con-
sumption changes in a ‘more concave’ way with labor income when the bond is taxed.
In this sense, labor income taxes become more progressive when capital is taxed.
The theoretical results derived above are rigorous, but have a few drawbacks. For future
research, we thus plan to perform some quantitative exercises to provide a more precise
understanding of the above findings. In particular, we plan to estimate the likelihood
ratio function from the model. This will show whether the assumptions made, for
instance, in Propositions 4.4 and 4.5 are likely to be satisfied in the data. Moreover, we
want to explore within a concrete counterfactual how much capital taxation changes the
curvature of labor income taxes from a quantitative point of view. Specifically, we aim
at comparing the shape of labor income taxes under the existing capital tax code with
the shape under the optimal code.
In addition, quantitative explorations will allow for the study of alternative progressivity
measures. While the theoretical part of this paper has focused on the marginal tax rate,
progressivity can also be defined with respect to the average tax rate as in Sadka (1976).
It may also be interesting to consider some alternative measures of progressivity, such
12Consider the following example: g˜(c) = exp(c) for c > 0, h˜(x) = (x+ d)
α
for x > 0, with 0 < α < 1,
d > 0. Then h˜(x) is concave in x, but g˜−1 ◦ h˜ ◦ g˜ (c) = α log (exp(c) + d) is convex in c.
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as the progressivity wedge discussed in Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan (2009).13 Finally,
quantitative explorations will highlight the welfare implications of capital taxation in
our model. Obviously, capital taxation is welfare-increasing in the present framework,
since it reduces the insurance value of asset accumulation. The magnitude of this effect
is not evident, however.
On a more general level, some further extensions of the model could be useful for future
research. First of all, the study of assets different from the bond might highlight the
boundaries of the present findings. Secondly, it might be interesting to see how the
impact of capital taxation changes when there is a desire for ex-ante redistribution.
4.A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4.1. See Gottardi and Pavoni (2010).
Proof of Proposition 4.2. If ξ > 0, we are done. If ξ = 0, then the first-order conditions
of the Lagrangian read
λ
u′(c0)
= 1,
λq
βu′(c(y))
= 1 + µ
fe(y, e0)
f(y, e0)
, y ∈ [y, y].
13Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan (2009) define the progressivity wedge as follows:
−
cs+1
ys+1
− cs
ys
cs
ys
.
When income is continuous, the corresponding expression is:
−
d
dy
log
c (y)
y
= −
d
dy
[log c (y)− log y] =
1
y
−
c′ (y)
c (y)
.
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Since f(y, e) is a density, integration of the last line yields
∫ y
y
λq
βu′(c(y))
f(y, e0) dy = 1.
As a consequence, we obtain
λ
u′(c0)
=
∫ y
y
λq
βu′(c(y))
f(y, e0) dy ≥
λq
β
∫ y
y
u′(c(y))f(y, e0) dy
,
where the inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality. The inequality is in fact strict,
since the agent cannot be fully insured when effort is interior. Hence, we conclude
λβ
∫ y
y
u′(c(y))f(y, e0) dy > λqu
′(c0).
For τ k = 0, we have q = q˜, however. Therefore, the above inequality is incompatible
with the agent’s Euler equation (4.7). This shows that ξ cannot be zero.
Proof of Proposition 4.3. We only show (i), since statement (ii) can be seen analogously.
Define
g(c) :=
λq
βu′(c)
− ξa(c).
Notice that 1
u′(·)
is always increasing. Therefore, if 1
u′(·)
is convex and ξ = 0 (or ξ > 0 and
a(·) decreasing and concave), then g(·) is increasing and convex. Given the validity of
the FOA, Proposition 4.1 (Proposition 4.2) shows that optimal consumption is defined
as follows:
g (c(y)) = 1 + µ l (y, e0) ,
where, by assumption, the right-hand side is a positive affine transformation of a concave
function. By applying the inverse function of g(·) to both sides, we see that c (·) is
concave since it is an increasing and concave transformation of a concave function.
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Proof of Proposition 4.4. Given validity of the FOA, c(y) and cˆ(y) are defined as follows
(see Propositions 4.1 and 4.2):
gλ (c(y)) = 1 + µ l (y, e0) , where gλ (c) :=
λq
βu′(c)
, (4.10)
gˆλˆ,ξˆ (cˆ(y)) = 1 + µˆ l (y, e0) , where gˆλˆ,ξˆ (c) :=
λˆq
βu′(c)
− ξˆa(c), with ξˆ > 0. (4.11)
Since l (y, e) is linear in y by assumption, concavity of cˆ is equivalent to convexity of gˆλˆ,ξˆ.
Moreover, since a(c) is convex in c by assumption, convexity of gˆλˆ,ξˆ implies convexity of
gλ =
λ
λˆ
(
gˆλˆ,ξˆ + ξˆa
)
. Finally, notice that convexity of gλ is equivalent to concavity of c,
since l (y, e) is linear in y.
Proof of Proposition 4.5. Recall that we have
gλ (c(y)) = 1 + µ l (y, e0) , (4.12)
gˆλˆ,ξˆ (cˆ(y)) = 1 + µˆ l (y, e0) , (4.13)
where the functions gλ and gˆλˆ,ξˆ are defined as in (4.10) and (4.11), respectively. First,
suppose that cˆ is a concave transformation of l. Since the right-hand side of (4.13) is
a positive affine transformation of l, this implies that gˆλˆ,ξˆ is convex. Now, notice that
convexity of gˆλˆ,ξˆ implies that gλ (c) =
λ
λˆ
(
gˆλˆ,ξˆ(c) + ξˆa(c)
)
is convex as well (since a(c) is
convex by assumption). Hence, using (4.12), we see that c is a concave transformation
of l.
Conversely, suppose that c is a convex transformation of l. Using (4.12), we see that gλ
is then concave. Convexity of a(c) implies that gˆλˆ,ξˆ is then also concave, which shows
that cˆ is a convex transformation of l.
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Proof of Lemma 4.1. If u belongs to the HARA class, we obtain
gˆλˆ,ξˆ(c) =
λˆ
λ
gλ(c)− ξˆa(c) =
λˆ
λ
gλ(c)− ξˆλ
1
γ κ (gλ(c))
−
1
γ , with κ =
[
γq
βρ(1− γ)
] 1
γ
> 0.
In other words, we have
gˆλˆ,ξˆ(c) = h (gλ(c)) , where h (g) =
λˆ
λ
g − ξˆλ
1
γ κ g−
1
γ .
The second derivative of h with respect to g is − ξˆλ
1
γ κ
γ
(
1
γ
+ 1
)
g−
1
γ
−2, which is negative
whenever γ ≥ −1.
Proof of Proposition 4.6. Recall that consumption is determined as follows:
gλ (c(y)) = 1 + µ l (y, e0) ,
gˆλˆ,ξˆ (cˆ(y)) = 1 + µˆ l (y, e0) .
As a consequence, we can relate the two consumption functions as follows:
1
µ
(
gλ (c(y))− 1
)
=
1
µˆ
(
gˆλˆ,ξˆ (cˆ(y))− 1
)
. (4.14)
Now the result follows from the simple fact that convexity/concavity is preserved under
positive affine transformations.
Proof of Corollary 4.1. Let cˆ be gλ-concave. By Lemma 4.1, we have gˆλˆ,ξˆ = h ◦ gλ for
some increasing and concave function h. Hence, when cˆ is gλ-concave, then cˆ must also
be gˆλˆ,ξˆ-concave. Now Proposition 4.6 implies that c is gλ-concave
To verify the second statement, let c be gλ-convex. From Proposition 4.6, we see that
cˆ is gˆλˆ,ξˆ-convex, i.e., gˆλˆ,ξˆ ◦ cˆ is convex. By Lemma 4.1, we have gˆλˆ,ξˆ = h ◦ gλ for some
increasing and concave function h. Since the inverse of h must be convex, we conclude
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that gλ ◦ cˆ = h
−1 ◦ gˆλˆ,ξˆ ◦ cˆ is convex.
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